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Do-Not-Track as Default 
By Joshua A.T. Fairfield 
Do-Not-Track is a developing online legal and technological standard that permits 
consumers to express their desire not to be tracked by online advertisers.  Do-Not-Track 
has the ability to change the relationship between consumers and advertisers in the 
information market.  Everything will depend on implementation.  The most effective way 
to allow users to achieve their privacy preferences is to implement Do-Not-Track 
as a default feature. 
 
The World Wide Web Consortium’s (W3C) standard setting body for Do-Not-Track has, 
however, endorsed a corrosive standard in its Tracking Preferences Expression (TPE) 
draft.  This standard requires consumers to set their privacy preference by hand.  This 
“bespoke” standard follows in a long line of privacy preference controls that have been 
neutered by increased transaction costs. 
 
This article argues that privacy controls must be firmly in consumers’ hands, and must be 
automated and integrated to be effective.  If corporations can deprive consumers of 
privacy through automated End User License Agreements or Terms of Service, while 
consumers are constrained to set their privacy preferences by hand, consumers cannot 
win.  Worse, the TPE bespoke standard is anticompetitive.  Already, browsers like 
Microsoft’s Internet Explorer 10 (IE10) will launch with default Do-Not-Track enabled.  
But the TPE bespoke standard offers advertisers a free pass to ignore the Do-Not-Track 
flags that will be set by IE10 and prohibits other browsers from offering automatic, 






“Once they notice you, Jason realized, they never completely close the file.  You can 
never get back your anonymity.” 
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¶1  A common Internet meme is that privacy is dead.1  It is more accurate to state that 
it has been buried.  Privacy features exist, but they are left inactive by default and buried 
deep in programs or on websites for only a few to find and use.2  This article asks 
whether a recent and promising pro-privacy feature will suffer the same fate.3 
 
1
 See Michael J. Kasdan, Is Facebook Killing Privacy Softly?  The Impact of Facebook’s Default 
Privacy Settings on Online Privacy, 2 N.Y.U. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. LAW LEDGER 107 (2011) (“In the age 
of instantaneous sharing of information on Facebook, it is fair to ask whether privacy is dead or dying, and 
whether online social networks like Facebook are killing it.”); see also Jared Newman, Google’s Schmidt 
Roasted for Privacy Comments, PCWORLD (Dec. 11, 2009, 9:06 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/ 
184446/googles_schmidt_roasted_for_privacy_comments.html (quoting Schmidt as stating, “If you have 
something that you don’t want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn’t be doing it in the first place, but if 
you really need that kind of privacy, the reality is that search engines including Google do retain this 
information for some time . . . .”); Private Lives? Not Ours!, PCWORLD (Apr. 18, 2000, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/16331/article.html (‘“You have zero privacy anyway,’ Sun Microsystems’ 
CEO Scott McNealy said last year.  ‘Get over it.’”).  But see BRIAN X. CHEN, ALWAYS ON 188–89 (2011) 
(arguing that privacy is more dynamic and has changed given technological developments); Nick Bilton, 
Privacy Isn’t Dead. Just Ask Google+, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2011, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com 
/2011/07/18/privacy-isnt-dead-just-ask-google/ (outlining how Google focused on privacy concerns in 
Google+ after learning from Facebook’s experience relating to privacy concerns).  
2
 Pedro G. Leon et al., Why Johnny Can’t Opt Out: A Usability Evaluation of Tools to Limit Online 
Behavioral Advertising, PROC. SIGCHI CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS COMPUTING SYS. 589, 589, 597 (2012), 
available at http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/rshay/pubs/CHI2012-opt-out-usability.pdf (presenting the results of a 
45-participant study “investing the usability of tools to limit online behavioral advertising” and concluding 
that “[n]one of the nine tools . . . tested empowered study participants to effectively control tracking and 
behavioral advertising according to their personal preferences” (emphasis added)). 
3
 See Stephen Shankland, Apache Web Software Overrides IE10 Do-Not-Track Setting, CNET (Sept. 7, 
2012, 9:34 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57508351-93/apache-web-software-overrides-ie10-do-
not-track-setting/ (“Apache, the most commonly used software to house Web sites, will ignore Microsoft's 
decision to disable ad-tracking technology by default in Internet Explorer 10.”).  But see Dan Goodin, 
Apache Webserver Updated to Ignore Do Not Track Settings in IE 10, ARS TECHINCA (Sept. 10, 2012, 
3:22 PM), http://arstechnica.com/security/2012/09/apache-webserver-updated-to-ignore-do-not-track-




¶2  The feature, called Do-Not-Track (DNT), could potentially change the balance of 
power between consumers and corporations in the U.S. data marketplace.4  Until recently, 
debate over Do-Not-Track focused on whether it would be implemented.  Recent reports 
from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), stakeholder statements at Senate hearings, 
and drafts from industry and standard-setting groups all indicate a growing consensus that 
some form of Do-Not-Track will be implemented.5 
¶3  This article asks a central follow-up question about implementation: whether a 
consumer must set a Do-Not-Track flag by hand, or whether she may choose automatic, 
pre-packaged software that sets the flag for her.  The article engages both industry 
arguments and the World Wide Web Consortium’s (W3C)6 Tracking Protections 
Working Group (TPWG) standard on Tracking Preference Expression (TPE), which 
requires that such a flag must be set by hand, without automation, in order to be 
enforceable or effective.7  This article refers to the by-hand requirement of the TPE as the 
“bespoke” Do-Not-Track requirement,8 and contrasts it with the norm for computer 
 
settings-in-ie-10/ (“Critics of the Apache update contend Microsoft's Do Not Track implementation . . . is 
in compliance with the standard.  A screen that is displayed when a user first uses the operating system 
offers two choices: Express settings and a more detailed Customized settings.  The same screen explicitly 
states that choosing the Express option will turn on Do Not Track.”). 
4
 Compare Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1635, 1648 (2011) 
(“Central to the issue of consent is the possible failure of the users to adequately understand the 
consequences of their consent—or to recognize that they are consenting to anything at all.”), and Jay P. 
Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Setting Software Defaults: Perspectives from Law, Computer Science and 
Behavioral Economics, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 583, 601 (2006) (“If a person does not know about the 
possibility of changing an option or the ramifications of each choice, then a default setting is equivalent to a 
fixed setting.”), and Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., Behavioral Advertising: The Offer You Cannot Refuse, 6 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 273, 292 (2012) (“Recently, Jonathan Mayer of Stanford University found that 
Google and other network advertisers . . . found a way to circumvent . . . cookie blocking.  The method 
used by Google was particularly brazen—it opened a webpage invisible to the user and used a program to 
simulate the user clicking on it.”), and id. at 295 (“[O]n a basic level, consumers’ manifestations of choice 
should not be circumvented. . . .  If advertisers wished to condition access to services on tracking, they 
could.  But to do so, they would have to have some dialogue with the consumer, rather than resorting to 
sneaky technical methods to obscure the tracking.”), with James P. Nehf, Shopping for Privacy Online: 
Consumer Decision-Making Strategies and the Emerging Market for Information Privacy, 2005 U. ILL. J.L. 
TECH. & POL’Y 1, 5 (2005) (“If consumers are aware of their privacy concerns and deem privacy important, 
they are more likely to take steps to protect their own interests—for example, avoiding firms that might 
compromise their privacy interests and frequenting the ones that are more likely to protect them.”), and Do 
Not Track: Universal Web Tracking Opt Out, http://donottrack.us/ (last accessed Sept. 3, 2012) [hereinafter 
Do Not Track Us] (“[D]o Not Track provides users with a single, simple, persistent choice to opt out of 
third-party web tracking.”), and Dean Hachamovitch, Windows Release Preview: The Sixth IE10 Platform 
Preview, IEBLOG (May 31, 2012, 5:57 PM), http://blogs.msdn.com/b/ie/archive/2012/05/31/windows-
release-preview-the-sixth-ie10-platform-preview.aspx (“In Windows 8, IE10 sends a ‘Do Not Track’ signal 
to Web sites by default. Consumers can change this default setting if they choose.  This decision reflects 
our commitment to providing Windows customers an experience that is ‘private by default’ in an era when 
so much user data is collected online.”). 
5
 See, e.g., Tracking Preference Expression (DNT): W3C Editor’s Draft 05 June 2013, W3C, 
http://www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection/drafts/tracking-dnt.html (last visited June 21, 2013) 
[hereinafter W3C TPE Draft] (“This specification defines the technical mechanisms for expressing a 
tracking preference via the DNT request header field in HTTP, via an HTML DOM property readable by 
embedded scripts, and via properties accessible to various user agent plug-in or extension APIs.”). 
6
 About W3C, W3C, http://www.w3.org/Consortium/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2012) (“The World Wide 
Web Consortium (W3C) is an international community where Member organizations, a full-time staff, and 
the public work together to develop Web Standards.”). 
7
 W3C TPE Draft, supra note 5. 
8
 See id. (“[A] tracking preference expression is only transmitted when it reflects a deliberate choice by 
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programs—that simple tasks should be automated and integrated wherever possible  
to reduce transaction costs.9 
¶4  At issue is whether Do-Not-Track will benefit the majority of consumers by 
providing a simple default, or whether it will only benefit those who find and set a 
privacy flag by hand.10  The consequences of this decision are significant.  Most 
consumers will benefit from Do-Not-Track if it is offered as a default feature of their 
browser.  Most consumers will not benefit from Do-Not-Track if they must research, 
find, and set the flag by hand.11  The debate over whether consumers can choose products 
that set Do-Not-Track by default is therefore critical to determining whether  
Do-Not-Track will work.12 
¶5  Microsoft sparked the current debate by announcing that it would implement Do-
Not-Track as a default feature in its next browser, Internet Explorer 10 (IE10).  Privacy 
advocates lauded the decision.13  The advertising industry did not.14  Industry advocates 
 
the user. . . .  For example, a user might select a check-box in their user agent's configuration, install an 
extension or add-on that is specifically designed to add a tracking preference expression, or make a choice 
for privacy that then implicitly includes a tracking preference (e.g., ‘Privacy settings: high’).”). 
9
 Cf. EXPLOITING THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY: ISSUES, APPLICATIONS AND CASE STUDIES, PART 1 171 
(Paul Cunningham & Miriam Cunningham eds., 2006) (“The Internet reduces transaction costs for business 
firms and provides consumers with more choices [and] more control . . . in some cases.  By automating 
purchasing functions, companies can eliminate mistakes and costs . . . [and] the availability of information 
through automated systems also improves product flows . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also Margaret Jane 
Radin, Reconsidering Boilerplate: Confronting Normative and Democratic Degradation, 40 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 617, 652 (2012) (“Is it possible to use automation to enable consumers to get terms they would 
actually prefer?  There are a few possibilities. . . . Online systems could . . . enable users to customize their 
own terms. . . . Filtering systems on personal computers would be market solutions because computer users 
would be free to use them or not use them . . . .”).  
10
 See generally The Need for Privacy Protections: Is Industry Self-Regulation Adequate?: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 112th Cong. (2012) [hereinafter Self-
Regulation Hearing] (statement of Peter Swire, C. William O’Neill Professor of Law, Moritz College of 
Law, The Ohio State University), available at 
http://commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=Hearings&ContentRecord_id=aa018084-ceea-472c-af63-
97d7f44fac80; see also Radin, supra note 9, at 654 (“Why are these possible automated systems not in 
use? . . . [P]erhaps it is believed that there is not a market for them.”); New Technologies and Innovations 
in the Mobile and Online Space, and the Implications for Public Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of 
Intellectual Prop. and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 72 (2012) [hereinafter 
Grimmelmann] (written testimony of James Grimmelmann), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/112th/112-116_74641.PDF. 
11
 See Kesan & Shah, supra note 4, at 601 (“If a person does not know about the possibility of changing 
an option or the ramifications of each choice, then a default setting is equivalent to a fixed setting.”). 
12
 See Grimmelmann, supra note 10 (written testimony of Professor James Grimmelmann) (“Users 
benefit from being able to delegate the choice to enable Do Not Track to Internet Explorer; it simplifies the 
option of choosing this form of privacy.  Microsoft will succeed in the competitive browser market if and 
only if users consider this a valuable feature.  But some other participants in the Do Not Track process, 
including representatives from Yahoo! and Google, have been pressing for the ability to disregard the Do 
Not Track request if it comes from a browser, like Internet Explorer, in which it is on by default.  This 
attempt to sabotage the practical usability of Do Not Track would make it pointlessly harder for consumers 
to express their privacy preferences.”). 
13
 See id. 
14
 See Julia Angwin, Microsoft’s “Do Not Track” Move Angers Advertising Industry, WALL ST. J., May 
31, 2012, http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2012/05/31/microsofts-do-not-track-move-angers-advertising-
industry/ (“Stu Ingis, general counsel of the [Digital Advertising Alliance], called Microsoft’s move a 
‘unilateral’ decision that ‘raises a lot of concern.’  He said that the industry supports ‘consumer choice, not 
a choice made by one browser or technology vendor.’”). 




raised several inaccurate and irrelevant objections to default Do-Not-Track,15 and 
threatened to ignore any DNT flag not intentionally set by the customer.16 
¶6  Instead of bowing to pressure to remove default DNT, Microsoft set the Do-Not-
Track flag by default as part of the express installation option.17  Roy Fielding, an author 
of the TPE, responded by offering a patch for web servers that caused them to ignore all 
DNT flags set by Internet Explorer.18  These developments may undermine the  
Do-Not-Track initiative.19 
¶7  The debate over the TPE bespoke standard centers on the standard for online 
consent.  Under the current language of the TPE draft, a default browser setting is not a 
valid expression of the user’s will.20  Although silence is not considered consent when 
consumers want to prevent tracking, silence is considered consent when consumers 
permit tracking.  Consumers consent to tracking without doing a thing,21 but cannot 
object to tracking even by buying and using browsers that offer automated enhanced 
privacy protection.22 
¶8  The TPWG’s bespoke standard binds consumers to corporate terms, and thus 
permits tracking, in the absence of consumer action.  But consumers must take bespoke 
steps to bind corporations to consumer terms.23  The TPE thus sets a precedent that is 
corrosive to future privacy features and to machine-mediated contracting online.  It 
denies consumers the ability to manage their privacy preferences 
through automation software.   
¶9  Privacy must be automated if it is to function.24  If regulators and standard-setters 
endorse the view that an online action can only create a legal obligation if performed by 
 
15
 See id.; Nehf, supra note 4, at 5 (“If consumers are aware . . . and deem privacy important, they are 
more likely to . . . avoid[] firms that might compromise their privacy interests and frequent[] the ones that 
are more likely to protect them.”).  Compare Hoofnagle et al., supra note 4, at 273–74 (“We empirically 
demonstrate that advertisers are making it impossible to avoid online tracking.  Advertisers are so invested 
in the idea of a personalized web that they do not think consumers are competent to decide to reject it.”). 
16
 See Angwin, supra note 14. 
17
 See Goodin, supra note 3 (“Critics of the Apache update contend Microsoft's Do Not Track 
implementation . . . is in compliance with the standard.  A screen that is displayed when a user first uses the 
operating system offers two choices: Express settings and a more detailed Customized settings.  The same 
screen explicitly states that choosing the Express option will turn on Do Not Track.”).    
18
 See Shankland, supra note 3. 
19
 See Grimmelmann, supra note 10. 
20
 See W3C TPE Draft, supra note 5 (“The basic principle is that a tracking preference expression is 
only transmitted when it reflects a deliberate choice by the user. In the absence of user choice, there is no 
tracking preference expressed.”). 
21
 See Hartzog, supra note 4, at 1648.  
22
 See, e.g., Sid Stamm, Why We Won’t Enable DNT by Default, MOZILLA PRIVACY BLOG (Nov. 9, 
2011), http://blog.mozilla.org/privacy/2011/11/09/dnt-cannot-be-default/ (“Mozilla’s mission is to give 
users this choice and control over their browsing experience.  We won’t turn on Do Not Track by default 
because then it would be Mozilla making the choice, not the individual.”). 
23
 Cf. Hartzog, supra note 4, at 1642 (“It has become a truism that virtually no one reads standard-form 
online agreements.  A recent study found that less than one in 1000 e-commerce website users read the 
terms of use.  Even Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts has admitted he does not read the fine print 
on websites.”). 
24
 See EXPLOITING THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 171 (“The Internet reduces transaction 
costs for business firms and provides consumers with more choices [and] more control . . . [and] the 
availability of information through automated systems . . . improves product flows . . . .”); Radin, supra 
note 9, at 651–54 (discussing the benefit of automated contracting for companies and that this benefit can 
be extended to consumers and tested in the market); Leon, supra note 2, at 589 (discussing the results of a 
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hand,25 then future privacy features will either not be offered or not be effective.  
Requiring consumers to protect privacy by hand while permitting corporations to benefit 
from automation is like holding a race between a sprinter and a drag racer.  No matter 
how much heart the sprinter shows, the race will be over before the sprinter  
gets off the starting block.26 
¶10  This Article proceeds in three Parts.  Part Two will provide a brief background on 
the Do-Not-Track debate and to the divergence of opinion over Do-Not-Track as default.  
Part Three will discuss a new theory of online privacy—that privacy must be fully 
automated to be at all effective.  Part Four will provide specific responses to industry 
challenges and potential counterarguments to this Article’s core assertions.  
II. BACKGROUND 
¶11  The first subpart discusses Do-Not-Track, its background, some details regarding 
its technical implementation, and some history of the debate over whether Do-Not-Track 
can be implemented as a default setting.  The second and third subparts deal with the 
overall rise in automated software contracting and the legal literature of  
online contract and software automation. 
A. Do-Not-Track 
¶12  Do-Not-Track is a simple idea27 that has been building for some time.28  Its core 
concept is that consumers should be able to state that they do not agree to online tracking.  
Currently consumers are not able to do so, both because until recently there has been no 
technological way to communicate their preference and because courts and regulators 
have not yet enforced that preference even when communicated.29  Before Do-Not-Track, 
a consumer’s only option was to agree to online Terms of Service or End User License 
Agreements that permitted tracking, or to not use the service.  The Do-Not-Track concept 
provides a technical method for delivering a legal message.  Yet despite its simplicity, 
Do-Not-Track has created an extraordinary amount of debate. 
 
study demonstrating the difficulty users have configuring privacy tools).  
25
 See, e.g., W3C TPE Draft, supra note 5. 
26
 See Leon, supra note 2; see also Hoofnagle et al., supra note 4. 
27
 See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, “Do-Not-Track” as Contract, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 545, 545–46 
(2012) (“When a consumer expresses her preference, in the very first exchange between the consumer and 
corporate computers, for the corporation not to track her information, the company is free to refuse the 
transaction if it does not wish to continue on the consumer's terms.”). 
28
 See Self-Regulation Hearing, supra note 10 (statement of Peter Swire, C. William O’Neill Professor 
of Law, Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University). 
29
 See Complaint at 10, Kim v. Space Pencil, Inc., No. CV-11-3796 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011) (initiating 
a lawsuit against companies such as Spotify because of regenerative tracking cookies).  Cf. Hoofnagle et 
al., supra note 4, at 292 (“Recently, Jonathan Mayer of Stanford University found that Google and other 
network advertisers . . . found a way to circumvent . . . cookie blocking.  The method used by Google was 
particularly brazen—it opened a webpage invisible to the user and used a program to simulate the user 
clicking on it.”). 




1. The Do-Not-Track Flag 
¶13  Consumer advocacy groups proposed Do-Not-Track to the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) in 2007,30 and researchers developed a prototype in 2009.31   
Do-Not-Track was loosely based on the FTC’s successful Do-Not-Call list.32  The FTC 
has on several occasions issued statements and staff reports encouraging some form of 
Do-Not-Track.  The FTC has not yet, however, enforced Do-Not-Track flags against 
advertisers, preferring instead to wait on results from the self-regulatory process.33  The 
vast majority of advertisers, therefore, continue to completely ignore consumers’ clear 
statements that they do not consent to tracking.   
¶14  The goal of Do-Not-Track was to provide a simple effective answer to the question 
of how consumers could express their desire not to be tracked.34  The Do-Not-Track flag 
is set in the user’s browser and is communicated to computers that the browser contacts 
via a message contained in the message header.35  The DNT heading is contained in the 
information that the browser routinely exchanges with website servers.  If the Do-Not-
Track flag is enabled, then the user’s browser tells everyone that the user does not 
consent to tracking.  
¶15  Unlike the centralized federal Do-Not-Call list, no government agency maintains 
the proposed Do-Not-Track browser feature.36  Do-Not-Call functions because telephone 
 
30
 See Louise Story, Consumer Advocates Seek a ‘Do-Not-Track’ List, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/31/technology/31cnd-privacy.html (“A coalition of privacy groups asked 
the government today to set up a mandatory do-not-track list for the Internet.  The groups—which include 
the Consumer Federation of America, World Privacy Forum and several others—are worried that online 
advertising companies are collecting too much data about consumers’ Web habits.”); Ari Schwartz et al., 
Consumer Rights and Protections in the Behavioral Advertising Sector, CTR. FOR DEM. & TECH. 2, 4, 
https://www.cdt.org/privacy/20071031consumerprotectionsbehavioral.pdf  (last visited June 22, 2013) 
(“[W]e urge the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to take proactive steps to adequately protect 
consumers as online behavioral tracking and targeting become more ubiquitous. . . . [T]he FTC should: 
[c]reate a national Do Not Track List similar to the national Do Not Call List[.]”); Christopher Soghoian, 
The History of the Do Not Track Header, SLIGHT PARANOIA (Jan. 21, 2011), 
http://paranoia.dubfire.net/2011/01/history-of-do-not-track-header.html (“In 2007, several public interest 
groups, including the World Privacy Forum, CDT and EFF, asked the FTC to create a Do Not Track List 
for online advertising.”). 
31
 See Soghoian, supra note 30 (“In July of 2009 . . . . [m]y friend and research collaborator Sid Stamm 
helped me to put together a prototype Firefox add-on that added two headers to outgoing HTTP requests: 
X-Behavioral-Ad-Opt-Out: 1 X-Do-Not-Track: 1.”). 
32
 Id. (“In a very savvy move, these groups named their scheme such that it instantly evoked the 
massively popular Do Not Call list.  That is, even if the average person did not know how the Do Not Track 
list worked, it would sound like a good idea.”). 
33
 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, SELF-REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 
(1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/07/privacy99.pdf (“The Commission’s goal has been to 
understand this new marketplace and its information practices, to assess the impact of these practices on 
consumers, and to encourage and facilitate effective self-regulation as the preferred approach to protecting 
consumer privacy online.”). 
34
 See donottrack.us for a list of academics, companies, and research groups associated with the effort to 
implement Do-Not-Track.  
35
 Jonathan Mayer & Arvind Narayanan, Do Not Track, http://www.donottrack.us/ (last accessed Aug. 
16, 2013) (“Do Not Track signals a user’s opt-out preference with an HTTP header, a simple technology 
that is completely compatible with the existing web.”). 
36
 See The Need for Privacy Protections: Perspectives from the Administration and the Federal Trade 
Commission, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 112th Cong. (2012) (statement 
of Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission), available at 
http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=Hearings&ContentRecord_id=4d001372-8bc0-
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numbers are limited and static, and thus advertiser lists can be scrubbed against a 
government-maintained database.  Since internet addresses change constantly, it would 
be difficult for a government entity to keep a list of IP addresses and require advertisers 
to not track them.  And the protection would do users no good, since their IP addresses 
would change with the next session.   
¶16  The Do-Not-Track flag is not a technological enforcement mechanism, and does 
not prevent companies from tracking against the consumer’s wishes.37  It merely states 
that the consumer does not consent to tracking.  The bigger question is whether 
corporations should honor the Do-Not-Track flag when they see it.  The Digital 
Advertising Alliance (DAA) had agreed in principle to honor browser-carried  
Do-Not-Track flags before it called that commitment into question over the issue of 
default Do-Not-Track.38  It remains very doubtful whether the DAA or its members will 
follow through on that commitment, as discussed below. 
¶17  A check-box in a browser is a standard method for communicating an enforceable 
legal preference.  Clicking “I Agree” is the standard means of communicating online 
consent.  Selecting “I Disagree” is no different.  Yet nearly all online advertisers refuse in 
practice to respect users’ clear and communicated preference not to be tracked.  Notably, 
those advertisers do not simply deny a user access to a website or service unless that user 
permits tracking, as would be a company’s unquestioned right.  Instead, advertisers 
ignore the expressly stated contractual condition that has been unambiguously 
communicated to them and continue to track non-consenting users. 
¶18  Do-Not-Track is a simple idea with broad support.39  Advertisers have therefore 
attempted to undermine the standard by diluting it and threatening to withdraw support, 
rather than by directly opposing it.  There are several lines of attack.  The Digital 
Advertising Alliance claims that Do-Not-Track still permits them to collect information 
on consumers as long as they do not target consumers with ads.40  This attempt to sidestep 
the purpose of Do-Not-Track has attracted some conversation.  FTC representatives have 
suggested that the agency believes “Do-Not-Track” must mean “Do-Not-Collect.”41  
Because the Do-Not-Collect issue has already gained traction, this article steps away 
 
422d-a18b-308e7e4cd820 (“Do not track, of course, will be run by the industry, it won’t be run like the 
government runs do-not-call.”). 
37
 See Hoofnagle et al., supra note 4, at 275–78.  
38
 See Digital Advertising Alliance, DAA Position on Browser Based Choice Mechanism, SELF-
REGULATORY PROGRAM FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING (Feb. 22, 2012), 
https://www.aboutads.info/resource/download/DAA_Commitment.pdf (“Today the DAA announced that it 
will immediately begin work to add browser-based header signals to the set of tools by which consumers 
can express their preferences under the DAA Principles.”). 
39
 See Need for Privacy Protections, supra note 36 (statement of Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Federal 
Trade Commission) (“[A]t this point, we are no longer asking whether do not track will exist but only how 
it will be implemented.”). 
40
 See Edward Wyatt & Tanzina Vega, Conflict Over How Open ‘Do Not Track’ Talks Will Be, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/30/technology/debating-the-path-to-do-not-
track.html (“The [Digital Advertising Alliance] . . . defines [Do Not Track] as forbidding the serving of 
targeted ads to individuals but not prohibiting the collection of data.”). 
41
 See Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations For Businesses and 
Policymakers, FTC 53 (Mar. 2012), http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf (“[A]n effective Do 
Not Track system should go beyond simply opting consumers out of receiving targeted advertisements; it 
should opt them out of collection of behavioral data for all purposes other than those that would be 
consistent with the context of the interaction.”).  




from the Do-Not-Collect debate to focus on the second, equally important, but less-
theorized attack on the Do-Not-Track standard.   
¶19  The second major assault on Do-Not-Track has attracted much less scrutiny.  It has 
even garnered a moderate level of support among creators of the standard and developers 
with a reputation for pro-privacy software.42  It is also the current position reflected in the 
W3C standard setting body’s Tracking Preferences Expression (TPE) document.  These 
entities seek a version of Do-Not-Track that would block Do-Not-Track as a default 
setting.  Under the current TPE draft, companies would only support expressions of 
privacy protection that consumers set by hand.43  Without timely and strong opposition, 
this bespoke standard for privacy preferences expression will become the rule.  Not all 
stakeholders agree, however, and the debate is not yet over. 
2. Default Do-Not-Track 
¶20  There are deep divides in stakeholder views on Do-Not-Track as default.44  In May 
2012, Microsoft announced plans to ship Internet Explorer 10 (IE10) with the Do-Not-
Track flag enabled by default.45  Despite speculation that Microsoft would retreat from 
shipping IE10 with DNT enabled, Microsoft’s Chief Privacy Officer Brendon Lynch 
reconfirmed in August that Microsoft’s position on default Do-Not-Track was essentially 
unchanged.46  Microsoft claimed in August 2012, contemporaneously with the 
manufacturing release of Windows 8, that consumer studies had convinced them that 
default Do-Not-Track was a popular choice.47    
¶21  Microsoft crafted an interesting response to the W3C TPE demand that tracking 
preferences be set by hand.48  Microsoft set the Do-Not-Track flag as part of the 
 
42
 See Stamm, supra note 22 (“Do Not Track is intended to express an individual’s choice, or preference, 
to not be tracked.  It’s important that the signal represents a choice made by the person behind 
the keyboard . . . .”). 
43
 See W3C TPE Draft, supra note 5 (“The basic principle is that a tracking preference expression is 
only transmitted when it reflects a deliberate choice by the user. . . .  We do not specify how tracking 
preference choices are offered to the user or how the preference is enabled . . . .  [A] user might select a 
check-box . . . [or] install an extension or add-on . . . .”). 
44
 See A Status Update on the Development of Voluntary Do-Not-Track Standards: Hearing Before S. 
Comm. On Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 112th Cong. (2013), at 1:06:16, 
http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=Hearings&ContentRecord_id=1cf8fb1a-fb0b-4bf1-
958b-1ea3c443a73c&ContentType_id=14f995b9-dfa5-407a-9d35-56cc7152a7ed&Group_id=b06c39af-
e033-4cba-9221-de668ca1978a&YearDisplay=2013 (browser and advertising industry representatives 
disagreeing over the use of default blocking of cookies); Judith Aquino, Privacy Advocate Jonathan Mayer 
Has Had It With ‘Do Not Track’, AD EXCHANGER (May 7, 2013, 3:31 PM), 
http://www.adexchanger.com/ad-exchange-news/privacy-advocate-jonathan-mayer-has-had-it-with-do-not-
track/ (“Advertising companies have an incentive to convince users that . . . users should allow them to 
collect data.  By setting those default settings to Do Not Track, we give interested parties the incentive to 
educate consumers about the impacts of [their] choices.”). 
45
 See Self-Regulation Hearing, supra note 10, at 23:50 (statement of Sen. Kelly Ayotte) (“As we all 
know Microsoft . . . announced Internet Explorer 10 will have its do-not-track component default set to opt-
out of tracking.”). 
46
 See Brendon Lynch, Do Not Track in the Windows 8 Setup Experience, MICROSOFT ON THE ISSUES 





 See id. 
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installation process.49  Users are informed that selecting express installation settings 
rather than custom installation will set the flag to Do-Not-Track.50  
¶22    Note that IE10 is not the first browser to set Do-Not-Track by default.  The TOR 
browser, for example, installs with a comprehensive list of privacy features already 
enabled.51  The TOR browser is used precisely because it automates many features of 
privacy protection.  Microsoft, however, has a far greater market reach.  An IE10 rollout 
of default DNT would mean that most consumers would have a choice as to whether their 
browser sets Do-Not-Track by default or requires hand configuration.  Thus, the 
pushback on default Do-Not-Track appears to be as much a response to Microsoft’s 
market reach as to the existence of the pro-privacy feature. 
¶23  The difference between a user setting a flag by hand in her browser and the same 
user agreeing to permit the express installation package in her browser to enable the same 
flag is conceptually interesting.  The consumer, after all, does take an active step in 
deciding what version of Internet Explorer to install.  That step might count as the active 
step that industry called for in the Tracking Preferences Expression.
 52   
¶24  As attractive as this conciliatory approach is, however, it was not accepted by 
industry.53  TPE author Roy Fielding promptly proposed a patch that would enable 
Apache web servers to ignore all Do-Not-Track flags sent by Internet Explorer.54  The 
Digital Advertising Alliance also announced that it would not require members to respect 
DNT flags because of the question of default settings.55  The debate over whether 
consumers may use default pro-privacy features is thus at the center of DNT 
implementation.  If permitted, browsers could define themselves by adding default 
privacy features.  Consumers would be able to make a choice for privacy by picking a 
browser that contains default, easy-to-use privacy features.  Consumers who do not want 
privacy can use browsers that do not automatically configure privacy features.  
Consumers who do want privacy should be equally free to select products that 
incorporate automated privacy protection features, like the TOR browser, or, in the case 







 See Paul Ohm, Good Enough Privacy, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 44 (2008) (“TOR is a type of ‘mix 
network.’  A mix network is structured in some ways like a peer-to-peer software trading network. . . . 
Through a series of clever cryptographic tricks . . . , none of the computers in the middle of the path can 
access the content of the communications nor discover the IP addresses of both the sending and  
receiving computers.”). 
52
 Compare W3C TPE Draft, supra note 5 (“The basic principle is that a tracking preference expression 
is only transmitted when it reflects a deliberate choice by the user.”), with Nehf, supra note 4  (“If 
consumers are aware of their privacy concerns and deem privacy important, they are more likely to take 
steps to protect their own interests—for example, avoiding firms that might compromise their privacy 
interests and frequenting the ones that are more likely to protect them.”), and Hoofnagle et al., supra note 
4, at 295 (“[O]n a basic level, consumers’ manifestations of choice should not be circumvented. . . . If 
advertisers wished to condition access to services on tracking, they could. But to do so, they would have to 
have some dialogue with the consumer, rather than resorting to sneaky technical methods to obscure the 
tracking.”). 
53
 See Self-Regulation Hearing, supra note 10, at 46:15 (statement of Berin Szoka, President, 
TechFreedom) (“Microsoft . . . decided in its new IE10 browser that it would set do-not-track headers by 
default.  Default do-not-track-on doesn’t empower users any more than would setting ad-blocking 
by default.”). 
54
 See Shankland, supra note 3.  
55
 See Angwin, supra note 14.  




3. The TPWG’s Tracking Preferences Expression Standard 
¶25  The core of the advertising industry’s resistance to default Do-Not-Track relied on 
language from the TPWG’s TPE standard.  That standard permits advertisers to ignore 
any DNT flag that the advertiser suspects to have been automatically set by a browser.  
This would require privacy-seeking consumers to set the flag by hand.  This subpart 
examines the language of the TPE in more detail.  As the TPE is not a finished document, 
this Article limits its analysis to language available at the time the Article was drafted.  
Readers may wish to consult further drafts of the TPE as the debate moves forward. 
¶26  The TPE’s adoption of a bespoke standard for privacy flags was ostensibly to 
protect consumer choice against third parties who would seek to make consumers’ 
choices for them.56 
The goal of this protocol is to allow a user to express their personal preference 
regarding tracking to each server and web application that they communicate 
with via HTTP, thereby allowing each service to either adjust their behavior to 
meet the user’s expectations or reach a separate agreement with the user to 
satisfy all parties.  
Key to that notion of expression is that the signal sent MUST reflect the user's 
preference, not the choice of some vendor, institution, site, or any network-
imposed mechanism outside the user’s control . . . .  The basic principle is that a 
tracking preference expression is only transmitted when it reflects a deliberate 




¶27  Yet the TPWG itself is an “institution . . . outside the user’s control”58 that seeks to 
make a choice for the user that does not reflect a “deliberate choice by the user.”59  This is 
because “in the absence of user choice, there is no tracking preference expressed.”60  To 
the TPWG, this means that tracking is permitted when consumers have not given consent.  
The TPWG’s current structure for the Tracking Preferences Expression makes 
consumers’ choices for them, while denying consumers the right to select any other 
trusted source, such as a browser with a reputation for privacy, to provide a 
comprehensive suite of privacy enhancements. 
¶28  A consumer’s choice to use a pro-privacy browser is a better indication of consent 
than is silence—which is what the TPE uses as adequate grounds to justify tracking.  A 
pro-privacy browser is a better reflection of the desires of its users than is the TPE.  
 
56




 Id.; see also Participation, W3C, http://www.w3.org/participate/ (last accessed Sept. 10, 2012) 
(“Participation in W3C Working Groups . . . is open to W3C Members and other invited parties. W3C 
groups work with the public through specification reviews as well as contributions of use cases, tests, and 
implementation feedback.”). Members of the public may join, but only as experts. See Instructions for Non-
Members (Invited Experts), W3C, http://www.w3.org/2004/08/invexp.html (last accessed Sept. 10, 2012). 
General members of the public have minimal interaction, let alone control, with W3C working groups, 
specifically the Tracking Protection Working Group. 
59
 W3C TPE Draft, supra note 5. 
60
 Id. 
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Consumers who desire privacy will rationally choose those products that not only provide 
the most privacy features, but also those which permit them to be used at the lowest cost.  
It is not reasonable to claim that that rational choice does not reflect the desire  
of the consumer.   
¶29  Assume that neither “please-track-me” nor “do-not-track” represents the wishes of 
all consumers.  Some prefer one, and others prefer the other.  The real question is which 
rule is best to set as a default, and how to reduce the transaction costs of the switching 
group.61  This shows the problems with the TPWG’s analysis.  It sets the default rule 
(tracking) to one that very few people want and raises the cost of switching away from 
that default as high as possible.  But in the Coasean sense, the best answer is not only to 
permit each party to choose what they want,62 but also to reduce transaction costs as 
much as possible.63  
¶30  Most Americans oppose online tracking.64  There is a reasonable case to be made 
that the default rule ought to be set to the majoritarian default—Do-Not-Track.65  This 
minimizes the number of people who need to incur transaction costs in order to satisfy 
preferences.  Yet no matter what the default, surely it would be better to permit parties 
who do not agree with the majority to satisfy their privacy preferences with the lowest 
possible transaction costs.  The TPWG’s standard would force consumers to set their 
privacy preferences by hand when those preferences could be set automatically through 
the consumer’s choice of browser.  The TPE standard raises transaction costs regardless 
of the consumer’s preference.66  
 
61
 See generally Self-Regulation Hearing, supra note 10. See also Kesan & Shah, supra note 4, at 601 
(“If a person does not know about the possibility of changing an option or the ramifications of each choice, 
then a default setting is equivalent to a fixed setting.”).  But see Nicklas Lundblad & Betsy Masiello, Opt-in 
Dystopias, 7 SCRIPTED 155, 156 (2010), available at http://www2.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol7-
1/lundblad.pdf  (“Where discussion diverges into heated debate is in the use of rhetorical terms that 
simplify the discussion into one of black and whites, when really there are a range of practices and 
solutions that deserve inspection.”). 
62
 R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 19 (1960) (“Even when it is possible to 
change the legal delimitation of rights through market transactions, it is obviously desirable to reduce the 
need for such transactions and thus reduce the employment of resources in carrying them out.”). 
63
 Id. at 8 (“[T]he ultimate result (which maximises the value of production) is independent of the legal 
position if the pricing system is assumed to work without cost.”). 
64
 See KRISTEN PURCELL, JOANNA BRENNER, & LEE RAINIE, PEW INTERNET PROJECT, SEARCH ENGINE 
USE 2012 39 (Mar. 9, 2012), available at http://pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2012/PIP_Search 
_Engine _Use_2012.pdf (“68% [of Americans polled stated] I’m NOT OKAY with targeted advertising 
because I don’t like having my online behavior tracked and analyzed.”); MARY HODDER ET AL., CUSTOMER 
COMMONS, LYING AND HIDING IN THE NAME OF PRIVACY (2013), http://customercommons.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2013/05/CCResearchSurvey1Paper_Final.pdf (“[P]eople limit, refuse to give or obfuscate personal 
information in an attempt to create a measure of privacy online.”); Stephanie Clifford, Two-Thirds of 
Americans Object to Online Tracking, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/30/ 
business/media/30adco.html (“About two-thirds of Americans object to online tracking by advertisers—and 
that number rises once they learn the different ways marketers are following their 
online movements . . . .”). 
65
 See, e.g., PURCELL, BRENNER, & RAINIE, supra note 64; HODDER ET AL., supra note 64; Hoofnagle et 
al., supra note 4, at 295 (“[O]n a basic level, consumers’ manifestations of choice should not be 
circumvented. . . .  If advertisers wished to condition access to services on tracking, they could.  But to do 
so, they would have to have some dialogue with the consumer, rather than resorting to sneaky technical 
methods to obscure the tracking.”). 
66
 Cf. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 4, at 273 (“We empirically demonstrate that advertisers are making it 
impossible to avoid online tracking.  Advertisers are so invested in the idea of a personalized web that they 
do not think consumers are competent to decide to reject it.”).  But see Stuart Ingis, Fears of Online 




¶31  The problem is inherent in the implementation of the DNT flag.  Do-Not-Track is, 
logically speaking, a binary flag.  The value of Do-Not-Track is equal to zero or one.  
The switch is either “on” or “off”.67  Yet there is a third state in the protocol, “unset,” and 
the unset state must be provided by every software agent designer.  Given that DNT:1 
means that tracking is forbidden, and DNT:0 means that tracking is permitted, the unset 
term serves only as a gap-filler, a placeholder, a state from which every consumer must 
take action at non-zero cost, in order to reach his or her true preference.
68
   
¶32  The no-default rule stops the consumer from escaping the cost of having to set the 
flag from “unset” to either “track” or “do-not-track” by selecting a browser.  The TPE 
working document states: 
A user agent must not send a tracking preference expression if a tracking 
preference is not enabled.  This means that no expression is sent for each of the 
following cases:  
 the user agent does not implement this protocol; 
 the user has not yet made a choice for a specific preference; or, 
 the user has chosen not to transmit a preference.69 
¶33  In so doing, the TPWG has set an undesirable standard both in technology and in 
law.  It sets the worst rule as the default and raises the costs of switching away from that 
rule.  The rule therefore increases costs for most users.  
¶34  The rule is also inconsistent in how it treats consumers and advertisers.  Under the 
TPE standard, software defaults create no enforceable rights in the hands of a consumer.70  
Yet software defaults create perfectly enforceable rights in the hands of advertisers.71  
The result of the TPE’s bespoke requirement for preference expression is that a company 
is free to ignore the Do-Not-Track flag if it suspects that the flag was set automatically by 
software rather than manually by a consumer. 
¶35  The question is therefore not merely one of privacy and consumers’ rights.  The 
deeper issue at play is whether consumers will be permitted to benefit from the massive 
rise in software agent contracting.72  If the TPWG’s no-default rule stands, it will be a 
 
Tracking Are Baseless, US NEWS, Aug. 20, 2012, 
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2012/08/20/fears-of-online-tracking-are-baseless (“[T]here have 
been efforts to shift from an open and seamless Internet to one where collection is not permissible unless a 
consumer opts in.  This approach would harm the online experience and is unnecessary because robust 
industry self-regulation is already giving consumers transparency and choice over online data collection.”).  
67
 See Do Not Track Us, supra note 4 (“Do Not Track provides users with a single, simple, persistent 
choice to opt out of third-party web tracking.”). 
68
 See Tom Lowenthal, Deeper Discussion of our Decision on DNT Defaults, MOZILLA PRIVACY BLOG 
(Nov. 15, 2011), http://blog.mozilla.org/privacy/2011/11/15/deeper-discussion-of-our-decision-on-dnt-
defaults/ (“DNT:0 means ‘I consent to being tracked.’ DNT:1 means ‘I object to being tracked.’”). 
69
 See W3C TPE Draft, supra note 5. 
70
 See id. (“[A] tracking preference expression is only transmitted when it reflects a deliberate choice by 
the user.  In the absence of user choice, there is no tracking preference expressed. . . .  If the user’s choice is 
DNT: 1 or DNT: 0, the tracking preference is enabled . . . .”). 
71
 See id. (“If the user's choice is DNT:1 or DNT:0, the tracking preference is enabled . . . .”) . 
72
 See Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: Standard Form Contracting in the 
Age of Online User Participation, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 303, 3056 n.3 (2008) (“[T]he 
digital environment can potentially offer a very different contractual setting, providing consumers with an 
‘electronic butler’ that will automatically signal . . . preferences to . . . vendors.”  (emphasis added)); see 
also JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 227–28 (2008) (“[W]e 
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serious blow to consumers well beyond the Do-Not-Contract context.  If consumers are 
required to contract by hand online, they will be so swamped with transaction costs that 
they will not be able to adequately protect their privacy interests.73 
¶36  The TPE bespoke standard privileges feature choice over product choice.  Under 
the standard, consumers must configure features.  They may not pick browsers that have 
a systematic approach to integrating and automating privacy protections.74  A consumer 
can only choose to increase her privacy protection through the roundabout method of 
choosing a browser that does not protect her privacy, and then modifying and configuring 
it so that it does.   
¶37  Consider an analogy.  Suppose a consumer wanted to purchase a fast car.  Under 
Regulatory Climate A, that consumer could choose a car built by a manufacturer with a 
reputation for speed.  The speed might be reflected in a range of features, from engine 
design to aerodynamics.  Under Regulatory Climate B, the consumer is forbidden to 
select a car with an overall reputation for speed.  She must rather research each feature, 
and in fact do some of the bodywork herself.  The difference between Regulatory 
Climates A and B is whether the consumer may make a choice at the product level or the 
feature level.  In both cases the consumer makes a choice.  The difference is in the cost of 
the choice to the consumer. 
¶38  Just as consumers should be able to choose cars with a combined feature set that 
makes them fast, consumers should be able to choose browsers with a combined feature 
set that makes them private.  Further, to say that a consumer who picks an overall fast car 
does not have a discernible preference for speed is incorrect.  The claim that consumers 




need ways for people to signal whether they would like to remain associated with the data they place on the 
Web, and to be consulted about unusual uses. . . . [W]e will face the question of when people ought to be 
informed when their online behaviors are used for ulterior purposes—including beneficial ones.”); 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 228–29 (2006) http://codev2.cc/download+remix/Lessig-
Codev2.pdf (“[A] privacy property right would create strong incentives in those who want to use that 
property to secure the appropriate consent. . . .  But without that consent, the user of the privacy property 
would be a privacy pirate.  Indeed, many of the same tools that could protect copyright in this sense could 
also be used to protect privacy.”); CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/about (last visited 
Sept. 5, 2012) (“[The creative commons system] give[s] everyone from individual creators to large 
companies . . . a simple, standardized way to keep their copyright while allowing certain uses of their 
work . . . .” (emphasis added)).  But see Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, To Track or “Do Not Track”: 
Advancing Transparency and Individual Control in Online Behavioral Advertising, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & 
TECH. 281, 284–85 (2012) (“Practical progress advancing user privacy will be better served if policymakers 
and industry focus their debate on the desirable balance between efficiency and individual rights, and on 
whether businesses implement tracking mechanisms fairly and responsibly.”).  For further discussion, see 
infra Section II(B), Software Agents and Automation. 
73
 Cf. Hartzog, supra note 4; Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy 
Policies, 4 I/S: J. OF L. & POL’Y FOR THE INFO. SOC’Y 543, 546 (2008); Jared S. Livingston, Invasion 
Contracts: The Privacy Implications of Terms of Use Agreements in the Online Social Media Setting, 21 
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 591, 626 (2011) (“[F]irms have the incentives and opportunities to impose 
additional costs on users to keep them from investing in research about the agreement (footnote 
omitted) . . . . So not only do consumers already not care to read their agreements, but firms can also make 
it worse, both of which make exploitation more likely.”). 
74
 See W3C TPE Draft, supra note 5. 
75
 See discussion infra accompanying note 80; see also Grimmelmann, supra note 10 (“Users benefit 
from being able to delegate the choice to enable Do Not Track to Internet Explorer; it simplifies the option 
of choosing this form of privacy.  Microsoft will succeed in the competitive browser market if and only if 
users consider this a valuable feature.  But some other participants in the Do Not Track process, including 




¶39  The TPE bespoke standard bans product-level choice with one exception.  The 
exception proves the problem.  The TPE draft states consumers may only exercise 
product-level consent by choosing a browser whose name includes the privacy 
preference.76  The exception only covers browsers whose very name includes the word 
“privacy” or the like in the name of the browser itself.  This excludes any mainstream 
browser from developing automatic and integrated default pro-privacy features.77   
The Draft states: 
A user agent MUST have a default tracking preference of unset (not enabled) 
unless a specific tracking preference is implied by the decision to use that agent. 
For example, use of a general-purpose browser would not imply a tracking 
preference when invoked normally as “SuperFred”, but might imply a preference 
if invoked as “SuperDoNotTrack” or “UltraPrivacyFred”.  Likewise, a user agent 
extension or add-on MUST NOT alter the tracking preference unless the act of 
installing and enabling that extension or add-on is an explicit choice by the user 
for that tracking preference.
78
 
¶40  This makes as much sense as requiring Ferrari to include “fast” in the names of 
their cars.  The most important expression of choice is the consumer’s choice of which 
product to use.  The requirement that the selection must be of a browser that has some 
designation of privacy preference in the name guts the exception.   
¶41  Brand loyalty must be built on a range of features.  A user might very well choose 
one browser over another because of additional privacy features,79 even though those are 
not the only features for which the browser is known.  Privacy features, like other 
features, play into the consumers’ choice of which browser to use.80  This is no less a 
demonstration of user intent than is hand-configuring privacy features.   
¶42  The “name” standard for browsers stops new pro-privacy brands from building 
name recognition.  Consider the TOR Browser.  It is certainly the browser that the TPE 
intended to protect when exempting special browsers from the requirement that privacy 
cannot be the default in browsers.81  Yet there is nothing in the TOR name that indicates 
that the TOR Browser is a byword in privacy circles.  One must first know that TOR 
 
representatives from Yahoo! and Google, have been pressing for the ability to disregard the Do Not Track 
request if it comes from a browser, like Internet Explorer, in which it is on by default.  This attempt to 
sabotage the practical usability of Do Not Track would make it pointlessly harder for consumers to express 
their privacy preferences.”  (footnote omitted)). 
76
 See W3C TPE Draft, supra note 5. 
77
 See Grimmelmann, supra note 10. 
78
 See W3C TPE Draft, supra note 5. 
79
 See Hachamovitch, supra note 4 (“[W]e think . . . consumers will favor products designed with their 
privacy in mind over products that are designed primarily to gather their data.”). 
80
 See Nehf, supra note 4 (“If consumers are aware of their privacy concerns and deem privacy 
important, they are more likely to take steps to protect their own interests—for example, avoiding firms 
that might compromise their privacy interests and frequenting the ones that are more likely to protect 
them.”); see also Hachamovitch, supra note 4; Scott Cleland, Why We Need A ‘Do-Not-Track’ Bill, WASH. 
POST, May 10, 2011, http://live.washingtonpost.com/why-you-cant-trust-google-scott-cleland-0510.html 
(“People deserve the right to vote for themselves if they want to be tracked . . . . [R]ight now people have 
no real choice because the technology is way ahead of what people want and the state of the law.”). 
81
 See W3C TPE Draft, supra note 5 (“[U]se of a general-purpose browser would not imply a tracking 
preference when invoked normally as ‘SuperFred’, but might imply a preference if invoked as 
‘SuperDoNotTrack’ or ‘UltraPrivacyFred’.”). 
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stands for “the onion router,” and what that means in turn, to understand that anyone who 
uses the TOR browser has clearly indicated by their choice to do so that they do not wish 
to be tracked.82  The most famous default privacy browser would, by the TPE’s name 
standard, be prohibited from building the very reputation for privacy it currently enjoys. 
¶43  Conversely, the UltraPrivacyFred standard prohibits mainstream browsers from 
retaining their customer goodwill while adding automated privacy features.83  Internet 
Explorer can never meet the “name” standard.  In order to gain a reputation for privacy 
protection, it would have to be named InternetPrivacyExplorer or something similar, thus 
denying it brand recognition and customer goodwill.  Similarly, mainstream browsers 
would have a problem building an actual reputation for privacy, since in order to do so 
they would have to set the DNT flag by default, which would mean that the DNT flag 
would be ignored, thus denying their users privacy protections.  This in turn would erode 
the reputation for privacy that the brand might attempt to build.   
¶44  Consumer choice is most often expressed at the product level, not at the feature 
level.  Building a brand based on privacy requires that companies be free to add privacy 
features without retaliation from industry groups.  Browser creators should not have to 
fork their products into separate, privacy-themed browsers.  The bespoke standard, which 
requires feature-level choice rather than product-level choice, therefore significantly 
inhibits competition in the privacy market.84   
4. The Problems of Default and Compliance 
¶45  It is also worth discussing how default and compliance work within the TPE 
framework.85  The question of default matters because in order to enforce a rule against 
defaults, one must have an idea of what a default is.  The question of compliance matters 
because even if IE10’s installation implementation runs afoul of the “no default” rule—
and this is by no means certain86—there remains the issue of how websites may respond 
while continuing to represent that they are compliant with the DNT standard.   
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 See Tor: Overview, TORPROJECT, https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en 
  (last accessed Apr. 2, 2013) (“Individuals use Tor to keep websites from tracking them and their family 
members, or to connect to news sites, instant messaging services, or the like when these are blocked by 
their local Internet providers.”). 
83
 Cf. W3C TPE Draft, supra note 5. 
84
 See Nehf, supra note 4 (“If consumers are aware of their privacy concerns and deem privacy 
important, they are more likely to take steps to protect their own interests—for example, avoiding firms 
that might compromise their privacy interests and frequenting the ones that are more likely to protect 
them.” (emphasis added)); see also PURCELL, BRENNER, & RAINIE, supra note 64, at 3 (“Just 38% of 
internet users say they are generally aware of ways they themselves can limit how much information about 
them is collected by a website.  Among this group, one common strategy people use to limit personal data 
collection is to delete their web history: 81% of those who know ways to manage the capture of their data 
do this.  Some 75% of this group uses the privacy settings of websites to control what’s captured about 
them.  And 65% change their browser settings to limit the information that is collected.”). 
85
 The Author is indebted to Professor James Grimmelmann for raising and discussing the points in this 
subpart in comments on a draft of this paper.   
86
 See Jonathan Mayer, Comment to Bug 53845 - Remove DNT Settings from httpd.conf, APACHE 
SOFTWARE FOUND. (Sept. 9, 2012, 4:02 AM), https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=53845 
(“The group has *not*, however, decided . . . [a]n installation/first-run option, like shipping Internet 
Explorer 10, is noncompliant. The draft text, in fact, notes this is an acceptable implementation . . . .”). 




¶46  The problem of what constitutes a compliant response to a default DNT flag can be 
broken down into two broad parts. The first asks what a default setting is.87  The second 
asks what it means when an advertiser states that she is compliant with the DNT standard.  
This subpart will address each in turn. 
¶47  a) Undertheorization of Default.—What constitutes a default setting is unclear.  In 
an email to the TPWG, professor and author James Grimmelmann sets out the basic 
problem.  The TPE standard tries to require deliberate choice and avoid ambiguity while 
prohibiting requiring any specific form of user interface.88  But these three factors are not 
independent of one another.  Unambiguity as to user choice requires that the user 
interface record and transmit the actions of the user in reaching that choice, as well as any 
actions that the browser takes in setting up that choice.89  To know what the user has 
chosen, one must know both what the user does and how the browser operates.90   
¶48  Assume, for the sake of argument, that when Microsoft asks customers whether 
they want to do an express install (which enables DNT) or a custom install,91 it still 
presents too much of a default setting and not enough of a deliberate choice.  The 
argument is incorrect92 but plausible.  This tells us nothing about whether a browser could 
frame the choice in other ways.   
¶49  The TPE itself notes that the choice of tracking preference might be presented in a 
range of ways.93  The TPE notes that a prompt at first use or a prompt after an update are 
acceptable.94  The distance between a prompt at first use and the prompt at installation 
offered by IE10 is not very large, if it exists at all.95  Nor is it clear how far along the 
short distance between a prompt at installation and a prompt at first use a browser must 
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 See E-mail from James Grimmelmann, Professor of Law, New York Law School, to Roy T. Fielding 
(Sept. 12, 2012, 7:35 PM), available at http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-
tracking/2012Sep/0167.html. 
88
 See id. 
89
 See id. 
90
 See id. 
91
 See Goodin, supra note 3 (“Critics of the Apache update contend Microsoft's Do Not Track 
implementation . . . is in compliance with the standard.  A screen that is displayed when a user first uses the 
operating system offers two choices: Express settings and a more detailed Customized settings.  The same 
screen explicitly states that choosing the Express option will turn on Do Not Track.”). 
92
 See W3C TPE Draft, supra note 5 (“The user-agent might ask the user for their preference during 
startup, perhaps on first use or after an update adds the tracking protection feature.  Likewise, a user might 
install or configure a proxy to add the expression to their own outgoing requests.”); Goodin, supra note 3. 
93
 See W3C TPE Draft, supra note 5 (“We do not specify how tracking preference choices are offered to 
the user or how the preference is enabled . . . .  For example, a user might select a check-box in their user 
agent's configuration, install an extension or add-on that is specifically designed to add a tracking 
preference expression, or make a choice for privacy that then implicitly includes a tracking preference (e.g., 
‘Privacy settings: high’).”). 
94
 See id. (“The user-agent might ask the user for their preference during startup, perhaps on first use or 
after an update adds the tracking protection feature.  Likewise, a user might install or configure a proxy to 
add the expression to their own outgoing requests.”). 
95
 To clarify, when you install a browser such as IE10, the install process includes clicking to download 
the browser from an installation of Windows or directly from a website.  An install wizard walks a user 
through options, such as a standard or custom install.  Within seconds the browser can install and appear on 
a user’s desktop.  A quick click opens the browser.  Two prompts appear: one at the time of install and one 
at the time of first use to adjust settings.  The gap between these prompts can easily be shorter than 60 
seconds. 
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travel in order to trigger the “no default” rule.  Browsers have countless ways to influence 
consumers’ decisions by framing, prompting, packaging, or reminding.96   
¶50  For example, it is not at all clear from the TPE standard how strongly or often a 
browser can present the choice.  The TPE explicitly references a choice presented 
regularly at startup,97 which is likely to have a strong effect.  It is possible to construct a 
browser presentation of choice in such a way that it has the same effect as a default.  A 
browser might employ regular reminders like some anti-malware programs do, in this 
case reminding the user that she is browsing with a flag unset and offering her a simple 
button to click to set the flag.  If the reminders are set one way—that is, if the user is 
prompted to set the flag but not unset the flag—there is no question that it will change 
outcomes.98  Even though some form of regular reminder or prompt is contemplated by 
the TPE, there is no doubt that browser prompting of this sort would come under heavy 
fire by advertisers as violating the “no default” rule.   
¶51  The point is not just that the rule is unclear.  Any rule can be criticized by pointing 
out close cases and outliers.  The problem is that the rule, according to its own terms, 
requires unambiguity.  The compliance of the advertiser can be measured only if user 
choice is unambiguous.  However, user choice must be ambiguous if the TPE does not 
dictate how the User Interface presents, records and transmits the record of the 
consumer’s choice.99  The standard vanishes if the advertiser has the power to judge 
ambiguities itself.  The risk is that the determination of whether an advertiser must 
comply with a Do-Not-Track flag will be resolved entirely based on the self-interested 
guesses of advertisers, as the next section details. 
¶52  b) Tracking Compliance.—Even if an incoming set DNT flag is determined to be 
an impermissible default setting, there is the question of how a website can respond while 
remaining DNT-compliant.100  This matters from a regulatory standpoint.  A website’s 
statement that it is DNT-compliant is precisely the sort of consumer-facing promise that 
will trigger the FTC’s ability to enforce.101  Compliance is defined in another W3C work 
in progress, termed Tracking Compliance and Scope (TCS).102  The TCS interacts with 
the TPE in that the latter specifies how a preference may be indicated, while the former 
discusses how user agents and tracking entities must comply.  In discussing compliance, 
 
96
 See Kesan & Shah, supra note 4, at 591–92 (“The malleability of software means that developers can 
add, remove, or change default settings. A typical program has tens (and up to hundreds) of defaults that 
are set by the developer. . . .  These defaults often come in the form of alert or confirmation boxes.”). 
97
 See W3C TPE Draft, supra note 5 (“We do not specify how tracking preference choices are offered to 
the user or how the preference is enabled . . . .  The user-agent might ask the user for their preference 
during startup . . . .”). 
98
 See Kesan & Shah, supra note 4. 
 
99
 See E-mail from James Grimmelmann, supra note 87. 
100
 Thanks to James Grimmelmann for comments suggesting this framework and the issues in this sub-
part. 
101
 See Making Sure Companies Keep Their Privacy Promises to Consumers, FTC, 
http://ftc.gov/opa/reporter/privacy/privacypromises.shtml (last modified Jan. 28, 2013) (“When companies 
tell consumers they will safeguard their personal information, the FTC can and does take law enforcement 
action to make sure that companies live up these promises.  As of May 1, 2011, the FTC has brought 32 
legal actions against organizations that have violated consumers’ privacy rights, or misled them by failing 
to maintain security for sensitive consumer information.”). 
102
 See Tracking Compliance and Scope: W3C Working Draft 30 October 2013, W3C, 
http://www.w3.org/TR/2012/WD-tracking-compliance-20121002 (last visited July 13, 2013). 




therefore, it is useful not only to discuss how a browser must comply with the standard, 
but also to discuss how a tracking server must comply when it receives a flag. 
¶53  When a server encounters a DNT flag that might violate the “no default” rule, what 
may a server do?  This is as yet undefined, and there are at least four options.103  First, the 
entire browser might be considered noncompliant because it sets some flags 
automatically.  It might then follow that the server would not be obliged to respect any 
flag the browser sends.  Second, the browser might be considered to be sometimes 
compliant, since some flags are set automatically, but some are set by hand.  As a result, 
the server might be permitted to ignore all flags set by the server because it cannot 
determine which flags are legitimate and which are not.  Third, the entire browser might 
be considered non-compliant, but because the DNT flag has been sent, the server might 
be required to comply with the flag.  And fourth, the browser might be considered 
sometimes compliant, but the server might be required to comply with some default-set 
DNT flags in order to meet its obligation to honor all compliant flags.  The first and 
second positions represent the advertiser position, and penalize all users of a given 
browser if any user of that browser benefits from a default setting.  The third and fourth 
positions represent the consumer advocate position, and do not permit the advertiser to 
ignore all flags by a browser merely because some flags might be improperly set.   
¶54  It helps to measure these positions by their impact on the overall standard.  The 
industry position destroys the standard.  As in the above subpart, there are serious 
disagreements about what forms of user interface violate the “no default” rule.  If the 
result of this unavoidable ambiguity is that a tracking server may ignore all flags—
including those set manually—the standard will cease to have any effect.  If advertisers 
can claim doubt as to the compliance of any subset of how the DNT option is presented, 
they could refuse to respect all flags from that browser, while still claiming that they are 
in compliance with Do-Not-Track as an overall standard. 
¶55  The consumer advocate position does not destroy the standard.  It resolves 
inevitable ambiguities regarding user interfaces in favor of respecting flags.  The 
counterargument is that it hurts companies by limiting their ability to track consumers.  In 
deciding which approach is best, it is useful to note that both of these positions get some 
cases wrong.  The advertiser position incorrectly handles all flags actually set by users 
who do not want to be tracked.  The consumer position incorrectly handles flags set by 
people who do wish to be tracked, but who have not set their tracking preference to ‘0’.  
The advertiser position invades privacy.  The consumer position creates inconvenience. 
¶56  The errors differ quantitatively as well as qualitatively.  The advertiser position will 
categorize more cases incorrectly than will the consumer position, because the majority 
of consumers do not want to be tracked.104  If some few consumers do wish to be tracked, 
they can opt in by setting DNT to ‘0’ for the same costs of unchecking a box that the 
standard now imposes on the majority of consumers.   
¶57  Resolving the necessary ambiguities created by different user interfaces in favor of 
permitting tracking will not merely impact default DNT.  It will remove the obligation to 
respect DNT altogether, whether the flag is bespoke or automatically set.  Resolving 
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 Thanks to James Grimmelmann for this framework, suggested in comments on earlier drafts of this 
article. 
104
 See PURCELL, BRENNER, & RAINIE, supra note 64; HODDER ET AL., supra note 64.  
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ambiguity in favor of respecting DNT removes the moral hazard of companies deciding 
for themselves whether they may track, and results in fewer and less damaging errors.   
B. Software Agents and Automation 
¶58  Do-Not-Track is merely the crest of an underlying wave of automated contracting 
through software agents.105  Software agent contracting has been a mainstay of business-
to-business contracting for a long time.106  There is, however, a problem with the current 
system.  Consumers have little access to automated contracting tools.107  Consider, for 
example, how long it has taken to provide consumers with a simple check-box that 
indicates whether or not they agree to being tracked.  E-commercial systems are designed 
very carefully to prevent consumers from expressing any contractual preference other 
than assent to the corporation’s End User Licensing Agreement (EULA) or Terms of 
Service (TOS).108   
¶59  Software agents have been around as long as computers.  Computers automate 
simple, repetitive tasks.109  Human/computer interaction works best when humans use 
high-level judgment and computers automatically handle the details.  Automation and 
computing technology are fundamentally inseparable.110  Consequently, it is odd to insist 
that a human perform a simple and easily automatable task, like setting a Do-Not-Track 
flag, by hand.   
¶60  There is a better solution.  What consumers or companies want to automate, they 
should be able to automate.111  Companies should not be free to selectively require their 
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 See Eric J. Feigin, Note, Architecture of Consent: Internet Protocols and Their Legal Implications, 
56 STAN. L. REV. 901, 902 (2004) (“Higher-level protocols . . . involve exchanges that should be 
considered express consent: the formation of a legally binding contract.”); see generally Séverine 
Dusollier, The Master’s Tools v. The Master’s House: Creative Commons v. Copyright, 29 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 271 (2006); Amelia H. Boss, Electronic Data Interchange Agreements: Private Contracting Toward 
a Global Environment, 13 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 31 (1993).  
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 See, e.g., KEE-HUNG LAI & T.C.E. CHENG, JUST-IN-TIME LOGISTICS 16–17 (2009) (describing the 
emergence of Just-in-Time (JIT) management approach in the services sector during the 1990s, with 
particular emphasis on Wal-Mart’s model). 
107
 See Becher & Zarsky, supra note 72, 308–14; see also Hartzog, supra note 4, at 1636; Charles L. 
Knapp, Opting Out or Copping Out?  An Argument for Strict Scrutiny of Individual Contracts, 40 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 95, 101–04 (2006) (discussing how dominance of the drafter has become typical in contract 
law).  Consumers lack access to automated contracting tools, let alone a seat at the contracting table. 
108
 For example, when you shop on Amazon.com, you are bound by multiple pages of terms in the 
Amazon Terms of Service.  The only contract terms you may send to Amazon are what you want, how fast, 
and how many.  
109
 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 72, at 209 (“The great flaw to the design of 1984 was in imagining just 
how it was that behavior was being monitored.  These were no computers in the story.  The monitoring was 
done by gaggles of guards watching banks of televisions. . . . [T]here was no single guard who had a 
complete picture . . . . [T]hat ‘imperfection’ can now be eliminated.  We can monitor everything and search 
the product of that monitoring. Even Orwell couldn’t imagine that.”). 
110
 See, e.g., id. at 22 (“[E]fficiency is made possible by technology, which permits searches that before 
would have been far too burdensome and invasive.”). 
111
 See EXPLOITING THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY, supra note 9 (“The Internet reduces transaction costs 
for business firms and provides consumers with more choices [and] more control . . . . [T]he availability of 
information through automated systems also improves product flows . . . .”); see also Radin, supra note 9, 
at 651–54 (discussing the benefit of automated contracting for companies and that this benefit can be 
extended to consumers and tested in the market); Hoofnagle et al., supra note 4, at 295 (“[O]n a basic level, 
consumers’ manifestations of choice should not be circumvented. . . .  If advertisers wished to condition 
access to services on tracking, they could.  But to do so, they would have to have some dialogue with the 




customers to engage in bespoke contracting activity at a given point within an otherwise 
completely automated process.  If legal rules were to dictate otherwise, they would place 
a heavy hand on the scales of the market.112  An automation ban prohibitively raises 
transaction costs on whichever party is barred from the use of automated tools and 
features.  Corporations that can deprive customers of privacy using automated tools will 
always beat consumers who have to protect their rights by hand.113   
C. The Legal Underpinnings of Do-Not-Track 
¶61  Law is deeply involved in the Do-Not-Track debate.  If stakeholders can agree on 
the implementation of a Do-Not-Track TPE standard,114 the FTC may adopt that standard 
and give it the effect of law,115 whether the FTC operates under its Section 5 authority,116 
or under separate authority from future legislation. 
¶62  Legal theory, and especially the theory of contractual consent, is also central to the 
Do-Not-Track debate.  That debate is extremely interesting in that it is a debate about a 
technical standard largely conducted in legal language.  The central debate over Do-Not-
Track is whether a consumer must set the Do-Not-Track flag by hand in order for it to 
 
consumer, rather than resorting to sneaky technical methods to obscure the tracking.”). 
112
 Compare Angwin, supra note14, and W3C TPE Draft, supra note 5 (“The basic principle is that a 
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113
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reject it.”); Self-Regulation Hearing, supra note 10 (written testimony of Bob Liodice, President and Chief 
Executive Officer, Association of National Advertisers, Inc.), available at http://www.ana.net/getfile/17771 
(“More than one million consumer opt outs have been registered under the DAA Principles since January 
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 See Alex Fowler, Mozilla Led Effort for DNT Finds Broad Support, MOZILLA (Feb. 23, 2012), 
http://blog.mozilla.org/privacy/2012/02/23/mozilla-led-effort-for-dnt-finds-broad-support (“[T]he W3C . . . 
has a vital role to play in creating an international standard for Do Not Track that represents the consensus 
of a broad group of stakeholders.”); Tracking Protection Working Group, W3C, 
http://www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection/ (last visited Sep. 28, 2012) (“The Tracking Protection 
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expressing user preferences around Web tracking and for block or allowing Web tracking elements.  The 
group seeks to standardize the technology and meaning of Do Not Track, and of Tracking  
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115
 See Wendy Davis, FTC Defends W3C’s Do-Not-Track Initiative To Congress, ONLINE MEDIA DAILY 
(Sept. 27, 2012, 6:27 PM), http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/183963/ftc-defends-w3cs-do-
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constitute a valid expression of consent.117  This debate might benefit from drawing on 
the experience of the law in determining what constitutes valid consent to be bound to  
an online contract.   
¶63  This section proceeds in three subparts.  The first subpart engages the legal 
literature on the objective theory of contract online.  The second subpart points out 
inconsistencies in the subjective standard endorsed by the TPE.  The third subpart will 
engage the literature of consent as it applies to mass-market online boilerplate and will 
argue that advertisers are drawing on this pro-consumer literature to harm consumers.   
1. The Objective Standard of Consent in Online Contracting 
¶64  There is an established literature on consent in online contracting.118  The literature 
has its own debates.119  For example, the literature debates the merits of the objective and 
subjective theories of contractual consent.120  However, the TPE standard lies well outside 
the contours of that literature, as this section explores.   
¶65  The legal literature broadly agrees that the standard for online contracting must be 
some flavor of objective.121  Pure subjective preferences are too easy to manipulate.122  
Thus, for example, secret preferences are not enforced because they have not been 
communicated to the other party.123  This principle yields the basic balance between 
subjective and objective preferences in contract law.  While contract law is a means of 
satisfying subjective preference, parties are bound to the objectively discernible meaning 
of their statements of preference.124  To do otherwise would be to render contracts 
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 See Perillo, supra note 121, at 477 (“The reason for the persistence of objective approaches can be 
found in the legal profession's distrust of the testimony of parties. . . .  When legislatures overturned [rules 
forbidding party testimony] in the nineteenth century, the profession, acting through the courts, made party 
testimony of intention irrelevant, giving birth to the modern objective theory.”). 
123
 See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 
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useless.  One party could always claim that she did not truly mean what was in the 
contract.  For these reasons, the objective theory of contract appears to predominate in 
questions of online, mass-market consumer contracting.125  The objective theory carries 
significant weight in black-letter pre-internet statements of contract law as well.126  
Courts have tended toward the objective theory of consent for reasons of discernment and 
administrability.127   
¶66  This article also tends toward the objective theory of contract because objective 
interpretations of contracts reduce transaction costs.  Yet one need not wholeheartedly 
endorse the objective theory of contract to criticize the one-sided application of the TPE 
standard.  Objective or subjective, the same standard should be applied to both consumers 
and corporations.  As the following section indicates, the TPE does not do so. 
2. The TPE Standard is Doubly Subjective 
¶67  The bespoke TPE standard is both inconsistent as applied to consumers,128 and 
doubly subjective, in that it relies both on the user’s state of mind129 and the corporation’s 
suspicions about the user’s state of mind to trump an objective, clear term.130   
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agreements is irrelevant.  Rather, courts consider what the parties objectively conveyed to each other in 
what is known as the ‘objective theory of contract.’  Only external acts and manifestations, not subjective, 
internal intentions, determine mutual assent to a contract.” (footnote omitted)). 
126
 See Perillo, supra note 121; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 & cmt. b (1981) (contracts 
determined by external manifestation of intent); id. § 4; id. § 5 (“A term of a contract is that portion of the 
legal relations resulting from the promise or set of promises which relates to a particular matter, whether or 
not the parties manifest an intention to create those relations”); id. § 18 cmt. c (“If one party is deceived and 
has no reason to know of the joke the law takes the joker at his word.”); id. § 19(1) (“The manifestation of 
assent may be wholly or partly by written or spoken words or by other acts or by failure to act”); id. § 19(3) 
(“The conduct of a party may manifest assent even though he does not in fact assent.”).  But see id. § 19 
cmt. c (“A ‘manifestation’ of assent is not a mere appearance . . . .  There must be conduct and a conscious 
will to engage in that conduct.”).  For an application of the objective theory to consumer form contracts, see 
generally Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer 
Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263 (1993). 
127
 See, e.g., Daniel J. Bussel & Kenneth N. Klee, Recalibrating Consent in Bankruptcy, 83 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 663, 670 n.25 (2009) (“Today a court generally restricts its attention to the outward behavior of the 
parties: the meaning of their acts is not what either party or both parties intended but the meaning which a 
‘reasonable man’ puts on these acts; the expression of mutual assent, not the assent itself, is usually the 
essential element.” (quoting Zell v. Am. Seating Co., 138 F.2d 641, 646 (2d Cir. 1943)).  Zell was 
overturned by American Seating Co v. Zell, 322 U.S. 709 (1944), on the grounds that it violated state parol 
evidence rules, but the court reasoning relating to contract interpretation stands.  
128
 Compare W3C TPE Draft, supra note 5 (“The basic principle is that a tracking preference expression 
is only transmitted when it reflects a deliberate choice by the user.”), with Nehf, supra note 4 (“If 
consumers are aware of their privacy concerns and deem privacy important, they are more likely to take 
steps to protect their own interests—for example, avoiding firms that might compromise their privacy 
interests and frequenting the ones that are more likely to protect them.”); Hachamovitch, supra note 4 
(“[W]e think . . . consumers will favor products designed with their privacy in mind over products that are 
designed primarily to gather their data.”); and Nehf, supra note 4 (“[R]esearch on bounded rationality and 
consumer decision making suggests that in most circumstances consumers, acting rationally, do not factor 
privacy policies into their decision processes . . . . [T]he research suggests that the problem is not solvable 
by reducing transaction costs and making information about privacy practices more visible or easily 
understood.”).  
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¶68  The TPE bespoke standard requires that a consumer prove to a web server that she 
specifically understood and intended to set the flag, in order for the term to be 
enforceable.131  The TPE requires that the setting of the flag must be the result of 
informed, deliberate choice.132  The standard permits corporations to ignore the flag if 
they suspect that the consumer did not intend to set the flag that the browser sent.133  
Compliance thus depends on the advertiser’s subjective valuation of the consumer’s 
subjective knowledge and consent.134  
¶69  This introduces a standard of actual, subjective knowledge and proof of 
intentionality as the benchmark for consumer preference expression.  The TPE bespoke 
standard uses the requirement of user choice as a barrier to preference expression, instead 
of as a means of achieving preference expression.  No bespoke action is required for the 
consumer to consent to tracking.135  The TPE bespoke standard thus endorses a subjective 
standard of actual knowledge and intentionality, but only when the consumer wants to 
protect her privacy, not when she wants to give her information away.136   
3. The TPWG Standard is Inconsistently Subjective 
¶70  If the standard for online consent were subjective, and if that standard were applied 
consistently, consumers could benefit.137  If courts enforced subjective intentions over 
objective terms, consumers would be bound by fewer website Terms of Use.  Consumers 
would be freed from browsewrap privacy policies that corporations currently use to 
 
129
 See W3C TPE Draft, supra note 5 (“The basic principle is that a tracking preference expression is 
only transmitted when it reflects a deliberate choice by the user.” (emphasis added)). 
130
 See id. (“[A] tracking preference expression is only transmitted when it reflects a deliberate choice by 
the user.  In the absence of user choice, there is no tracking preference expressed.”).  But see Do Not Track 
Us, supra note 4 (“Do Not Track provides users with a single, simple, persistent choice to opt out of third-
party web tracking.”)   
131
 See W3C TPE Draft, supra note 5. 
132
 See id. (“[A] tracking preference expression is only transmitted when it reflects a deliberate choice by 
the user. In the absence of user choice, there is no tracking preference expressed.”). 
133
 See id. (“The basic principle is that a tracking preference expression is only transmitted when it 
reflects a deliberate choice by the user. In the absence of user choice, there is no tracking preference 
expressed.”); E-mail from ifette@google.com to Dan Auerbach, Staff Technologist, Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (Oct. 17, 2012, 1:09 PM), available at http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-
tracking/2012Oct/0302.html (“[I]f DNT does not reflect a user's preference, then there is simply no reason 
to adhere to it regardless of the signal's deployment.  Advertisers won't care, so ad networks won't care; the 
existing opt-out mechanisms are more accurate than an invalid DNT signal.”). 
134
 See W3C TPE Draft, supra note 5; Auerbach, supra note 133. 
135
 See Auerbach, supra note 133; see also John Simpson, Comment to Do-Not-Track Community 
Group, W3C (Jan. 14, 2012), http://www.w3.org/community/dntrack/  (“If DNT=1, site MUST send 
response header (for compliance validation) (if no response header sent, this would mean non-
compliance . . . .)”). 
136
 Compare W3C TPE Draft, supra note 5 (“The goal of this protocol is to allow a user to express their 
personal preference regarding tracking to each server and web application that they communicate with via 
HTTP . . . .  Key to that notion of expression is that the signal sent MUST reflect the user’s 
preference . . . .”), with Perillo, supra note 121, at 427 (“By giving effect to the parties' intentions, the law 
of contracts is based on respect for party autonomy.  Nonetheless, the objective theory of contract 
formation and interpretation holds that the intentions of the parties to a contract . . . are to be ascertained 
from their words and conduct rather than their unexpressed intentions.”). 
137
 See Radin, supra note 119, at 620–24 (hypothesizing a separation between contract law, governed 
under traditional notions of consent, and regulation of boilerplate, which has a strained relationship with 
traditional notions of consent). 




justify tracking—policies that consumers do not read, understand, or desire.138  People 
would be bound only by the terms that they understood and specifically chose.  That is 
not this world, but it is a nice one.  Yet tellingly, that is precisely what the TPE bespoke 
standard does not do.  It instead uses the usual objective rules to tell companies that they 
may track, and only introduces subjectivity as grounds to doubt that a consumer means 
what she says. 
¶71  This article therefore criticizes the TPE standard both for inconsistency and for 
excess subjectivity.  The TPE standard applies a bespoke, subjective theory of contract 
consent139 when that theory will hurt consumers by raising transaction costs for their 
expressions of preference,140 but applies a standardized, objective theory of consent when 
that theory would help corporations.  As things stand, the dividing line is not between 
objective and subjective, but between consumer and corporate power.  
¶72  The standard for Do Not Track should not be selectively based on whether a 
consumer or a corporation offers the term.141  Consumers should not be bound by silence 
when agreeing to corporate terms, but required to take bespoke steps to bind corporations 
to consumer terms.  To show the logical flaw in another way, assume that the TPE 
bespoke standard for subjective intentionality were the online rule.  One might think that 
advertisers would be deeply concerned.  If enforceability rides on subjective preference 
and not on objectively expressed terms, people who enable the tracking flag to 
objectively indicate that tracking is acceptable, but subjectively intend not to be tracked, 
would pose a serious threat to advertisers.  In that case, tracking would be impermissible 
even though the advertiser had received the “all clear” from the user’s browser. 
 
138
 See, e.g., Spotify Privacy Policy, SPOTIFY (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.spotify.com/us/legal/privacy-
policy/ (“When you sign up for the Service, we may collect information we ask you for, like your 
username, password, e-mail address, date of birth, gender, postal code, and country.  We may also collect 
information you voluntarily add to your profile, such as your mobile phone number and mobile service 
provider.  If you connect to the Service using your Facebook credentials, you authorise us to collect your 
authentication information, such as your username, encrypted access credentials, and other information that 
may be available on or through your Facebook account, including your name, profile picture, country, 
hometown, e-mail address, date of birth, gender, friends’ names and profile pictures and networks.  We 
may store this information so that it can be used for the purposes explained in Section 3 and may verify 
your credentials with Facebook.); see also Complaint, Kim v. Space Pencil, Inc., No. CV-11-3796 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 1, 2011); Hoofnagle et al., supra note 4, at 292 (“The KissMetrics system presents another 
problem, in addition to a lack of notice and invalidation of choice.  It allows companies to aggregate 
information about users in new ways that consumers are unlikely to understand.”). 
139
 See W3C TPE Draft, supra note 5 (“The goal of this protocol is to allow a user to express their 
personal preference regarding tracking . . . .  Key to that notion of expression is that the signal sent MUST 
reflect the user’s preference, not the choice of some vendor, institution, site, or any network-imposed 
mechanism outside the user’s control.”). 
140
 See Kesan & Shah, supra note 4, 601–02; see also Leon, supra note 2, at 597 (“If a user proactively 
downloads a browser add-on like Ghostery or TACO, or proactively visits an opt-out website, their action 
indicates that they likely intend to block tracking.  However, Ghostery and TACO do not block any trackers 
by default, and enabling tracking involves multiple clicks.”); Riva Richmond, Resisting the Online 
Tracking Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/11/technology/personaltech/11basics.html (“Keeping your computer free 
of tracking programs is not easy . . . .  A number of tools can minimize tracking, but using them requires 
considerable effort and tech know-how.” (emphasis added)).  
141
 See W3C TPE Draft, supra note 5 (“[A] tracking preference expression is only transmitted when it 
reflects a deliberate choice by the user.  In the absence of user choice, there is no tracking preference 
expressed.”). 
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¶73  Online contracts do not and cannot function in this manner.  Parties to online 
contracts exchange standardized language all the time.142  There is little inquiry as to 
whether the parties truly wanted, explicitly intended, or even bothered to read each 
clause.143  Online parties are bound to the objective meaning of communicated terms.  
Mainstream contract theory certainly does not require that online parties read, or 
somehow explicitly adopt by deliberate choice, their contractual terms by some act 
beyond communicating them to the other party.144  Were that the standard, no online 
contract would stand, since vanishingly few of them are read by anyone.145  With some 
exceptions for unconscionability, parties to online contracts are bound to what they 
would have understood had they read the terms.146   
¶74  Corporate webservers automatically communicate legal terms of service and end 
user license agreements (TOS’s and EULAs) to consumers all the time.147  There is no 
reason that a consumer cannot communicate terms to the corporation in exactly the same 
fashion.148  There is no reasonable unconscionability attack on a consumer’s statement 
that she does not desire to be tracked.  All that is missing is a technological means of 
automatically communicating that contractual term to the corporation.  That is what Do-
Not-Track is, in the legal sense.  It communicates the critical term that matters to a 
customer.  The Do-Not-Track flag indicates to the corporation that if the corporation 
wishes to do business with the consumer, it must do so without tracking.  
 
142
 See Becher & Zarsky, supra note 72, at 305 (“For many decades, numerous consumer 
transactions . . . have [occurred] through, standard form contracts ("SFCs").  Form contracting will 
presumably continue to predominate, as modern technology and recent developments bring new and 
improved standard contracting practices into the market.  One prominent example 
is online contracting . . . .”). 
143
 See Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 466 (2006) (“Clickwraps put some 
pressure on the classical notion of assent derived from bargained agreements, because they substitute a 
blanket, take-it-or-leave-it assent for the classical notion that the parties actually thought about and agreed 
to the terms of the deal.”).  
144
 See W3C TPE Draft, supra note 5 (“The basic principle is that a tracking preference expression is 
only transmitted when it reflects a deliberate choice by the user.”); Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form 
Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 635 (2002) (“Now think of click license agreements on web sites.  
When one clicks "I agree" to the terms on the box, does one usually know what one is doing?  Absolutely.  
There is no doubt whatsoever that one is objectively manifesting one's assent to the terms in the box, 
whether or not one has read them.”). 
145
 See Hartzog, supra note 107, at 1642 (“It has become a truism that virtually no one reads standard-
form online agreements.”). 
146
 See Nathan J. Davis, Note, Presumed Assent: The Judicial Acceptance of Clickwrap, 22 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 577, 579 (2007) (“[A]bsent fraud or deception, the user's failure to read, carefully consider, or 
otherwise recognize the binding effect of clicking ‘I Agree’ will not preclude the court from finding 
assent to the terms.”).  
147
 See, e.g., MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Each WoW 
player must read and accept Blizzard’s End User License Agreement (‘EULA’) and Terms of Use (‘ToU’) 
on multiple occasions.”), amended by denial of reh’g, No. 09-15932, 2011 WL 538748 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 
2011); Kloth v. Microsoft Corp., 444 F.3d 312, 318 (4th Cir. 2006) (“To use Microsoft software, the end-
users were required to agree to the EULAs, which provided, among other things, a Microsoft-funded refund 
to the end-user if the end-user declined to enter into the EULA.”). 
148
 See Fairfield, supra note 27, at 581–84; see also Dusollier, supra note 105 (discussing that the 
purpose of Creative Commons is to address the over-expansion of copyright and rebalance in favor of 
future creators and users of copyrighted works). 




4. The Boilerplate Literature 
¶75  An overlapping literature discusses the impact of boilerplate on consent theory.149  
This literature is related to the discussions of the objective theory of contract, but has its 
own history.  Boilerplate is ubiquitous online, and it is often used in situations marked by 
disparate bargaining power.150  The dominance of online boilerplate raises serious 
questions as to whether the consumer has given any meaningful consent.151   
¶76  As with the discussion of objectivity and subjectivity above, the opponents of 
default Do-Not-Track draw on the language of consumer protection.152  Advertisers argue 
that consumer-offered standardized contracts should not be enforced, using arguments 
that consumer advocates developed to explain why corporate-offered standard contracts 
should not be enforced.153  The advertising industry thus uses pro-consumer arguments 
against consumers.   
¶77  Consumer advocates should continue to challenge whether consumers 
meaningfully consent to corporate-proffered contracts.  But that has nothing to do with 
whether consumers consent to consumers’ own terms.  That would read the literature 
backwards.  The boilerplate literature nowhere asserts that corporations are not bound by 
the terms they themselves offer.  Much the contrary: when a rare term that benefits 
consumers appears in a corporate-drafted contract, the corporation is held to the very jot 
and tittle of its statement.154 
¶78  The other reasons for concern over consent to boilerplate do not appear to apply, 
either.  Common criticisms of corporate-drafted contracts are that they exploit 
asymmetric bargaining power through the consumers’ economic need or the 
corporations’ dominant market position, or that such contracts exploit information 
asymmetry because the contracts are long and complicated.155  These reasons are not 
 
149
 See, e.g., Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, What’s in a Standard Form Contract? An Empirical Analysis 
of Software License Agreements, 4 J.  EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 677, 678 (2007) (addressing the lack of 
consumer choice in accepting boilerplate language in standard form contracts). 
150
 See Knapp, supra note 107; Lemley, supra note 143, at 459 (2006) (“Today, by contrast, more and 
more courts and commentators seem willing to accept the idea that if a business writes a document and 
calls it a contract, courts will enforce it as a contract even if no one agrees to it.”). 
151
 See Lemley, supra note 150 (“Clickwraps put some pressure on the classical notion of assent derived 
from bargained agreements, because they substitute a blanket, take-it-or-leave-it assent for the classical 
notion that the parties actually thought about and agreed to the terms of the deal.”). 
152
 See W3C TPE Draft, supra note 5 (“The goal of this protocol is to allow a user to express their 
personal preference regarding tracking . . . .  Key to that notion of expression is that the signal sent MUST 
reflect the user’s preference . . . .”); Julia Angwin, supra note 14 (“Stu Ingis, general counsel of the [Digital 
Advertising Alliance] . . . . said that the industry supports ‘consumer choice, not a choice made by one 
browser or technology vendor.’”); see also Shankland, supra note 3 (“Roy Fielding, an author of the Do 
Not Track (DNT) standard and principal scientist at Adobe Systems, wrote a patch for Apache . . . that sets 
the Web server to disable DNT if the browser reaching it is Internet Explorer 10.  ‘Apache does not tolerate 
deliberate abuse of open standards,’ Fielding titled the patch.”).  
153
 See supra subparts II.C.1–3. 
154
 See Yellowbook Inc. v. Brandeberry, 708 F.3d 837, 847 (6th Cir. 2013) (discussing contra 
proferentem, the canon of construction interpreting contract terms against the drafter: “[T]he ‘contra 
proferentem’ canon is meant primarily for cases ‘where the written contract is standardized and between 
parties of unequal bargaining power.’” (quoting Savedoff v. Access Group, Inc., 524 F.3d 754, 764 (6th 
Cir. 2008))). 
155
 See Shmuel I. Becher, Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge that is Yet to 
be Met, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 723, 734 (2008) (“The existence of obligational asymmetric information is a 
serious market failure that can undermine the efficiency of many consumer transactions.”); Russell 
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present when one considers a simple, consumer-offered Do-Not-Track term.  Consumers 
offer no economic coercion.  They have no monopoly.  A Do-Not-Track term is not 
prolix or obfuscatory, unlike corporate boilerplate.   
¶79  Consumer advocates should try to put the power of automated, standardized 
contracts into consumers’ hands.156  Standardized contracts in consumers’ hands are 
different from standardized contracts in corporate hands.  When a consumer proffers a 
standardized contract, she is expressing a preference.  No one would think a corporation 
was not expressing a contractual preference if it offered automated terms via webservers.  
The same should be true of consumers offering terms through web browsers.   
¶80  It is understandable that legal academics resist corporate boilerplate terms by 
questioning whether consumers meaningfully consent to corporate-drafted contracts.  But 
arguments about why consumers do not consent to corporate terms do not apply to a 
discussion of whether consumers consent to their own terms.  Arguments about consent 
are being misused to prevent consumers from benefiting from asserting their own 
boilerplate terms.  That was not what consumer advocates meant when they critiqued 
consent in boilerplate, nor should it be used here to stop consumers from benefitting from 
their own automated, default legal terms telling companies not to track.      
5. Political Impact of Mistakes in Contract Theory 
¶81  The advertising industry continues to assert that compliance with the Do-Not-Track 
standard is voluntary.157  That is only true to the extent that compliance with any valid 
contract term is voluntary.  If a consumer offers to do business on the condition that she 
is not tracked, and the advertiser proceeds to do business with the consumer based on that 
knowledge, the advertiser has accepted that term.158  The term is as binding as any that 
the web server might convey to the consumer.  The advertiser cannot plead ignorance and 
proceed as if the advertiser had received permission to track.   
¶82  A consumer contractual term stating, “If you (corporation) want to do business with 
me, you may not track me,” is, without question, enforceable.  A breach of that promise 
is a breach of contract and an unfair business practice.  In insisting on their right to ignore 
consumers’ facially valid Do-Not-Track flags, advertisers follow a dangerous path.  
There is no legal difference between a corporation asserting in its privacy policy that it 
will not track, and a corporation’s acceptance of a consumer’s term that bars tracking.159  
 
Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L.R. 1203, 
1233–34 (2003) (“[I]t is not difficult to explain the common observation that buyers rarely read the terms in 
form contracts.  It is not simply the fact that reading the terms (and sometimes understanding them) is time-
consuming . . .  although it is no doubt true that in some cases the time investment required outweighs the 
benefits . . . ." (footnote omitted)). 
 
156
 See Radin, supra note 9.  
157
 See, e.g., Todd R. Weiss, Google Adding 'Do No Track' Into Chrome's Latest Developer Build, 
EWEEK (Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/Google-Adding-Do-No-Track-Into-
Chromes-Latest-Developer-Build-852453/ (“Do Not Track controls built into Web browsers only have to 
be complied with by Websites and advertisers on a voluntary basis because there are no laws or 
requirements that control such information today.”).  
158
 See Fairfield, supra note 27 (“When a consumer expresses her preference, in the very first exchange 
between the consumer and corporate computers, for the corporation not to track her information, the 
company is free to refuse the transaction if it does not wish to continue on the consumer's terms.”).  
159
 See Hartzog, supra note 4, at 1643 (“When a website contains the phrase, ‘we respect your privacy,’ 




Both are contractual consumer-facing promises; both are equally valid and enforceable.  
Online advertisers that ignore Do-Not-Track flags breach numerous privacy contractual 
promises every day.  Corporations have been given some leeway to self-regulate, but 
instead of seizing that opportunity, many have chosen to undermine the DNT standard, 
perhaps hoping to avoid regulation while ensuring that the standard provides consumers 
little meaningful protection.160   
¶83  The FTC has for the time being chosen to let the self-regulatory process work itself 
out.161  Waiting on self-regulation is perhaps wise politics, but it is wise politics only for 
the FTC, not for the advertisers that ignore DNT flags and the consumers who continue to 
be tracked against their wishes.  If the Do-Not-Track standard produces a real standard 
that protects consumers, the FTC receives the benefit of a strong rule without appearing 
interventionist.  If the debate over default Do-Not-Track scuttles the Do-Not-Track 
effort,162 the FTC will be able to point to repeated industry failures to implement even the 
most radically simple consumer protection.  Further, the FTC has not hesitated in the past 
to enforce consumer-facing privacy promises against companies that violate them.163  
Should the self-regulatory process fail, it could certainly do so in the case of  
ignored DNT flags.  
III. WHY PRIVACY MUST BE AUTOMATED 
¶84  This section turns from the discussion of default DNT and the TPE bespoke 
standard to a broader discussion about automation and privacy.  It makes two arguments.  
First, it argues that substantive theories of privacy must be considered especially suspect 
 
it does not matter what the website intended.  The question is what a reasonable person in the user’s 
position would have understood from that communication.” (footnote omitted)); Fairfield, supra note 158; 
see also E-mail from Peter Cranstone to W3 Tracking (June 20, 2012, 8:23 AM) 
(http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-tracking/2012Jun/0556.html) (“The expectation of a binary 
protocol (DNT:1) is very simple.  It means what it says from the users perspective.  It's now time to align 
that with the decisions made by the server.  I doubt failure is going to be an option in this case.”). 
160
 See Shankland, supra note 3 (“‘If the site does not believe the DNT:1 signal is valid, then why would 
anyone in the supply chain be expected to honor the invalid signal?’ asked Mike Zaneis, general counsel of 
the Internet Advertising Bureau in a comment on the DNT standard.”). 
161
 See Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change, supra note 41, at 3  (“As part of the 
call for simplified choice, staff asked industry to develop a mechanism that would allow consumers to more 
easily control the tracking of their online activities, often referred to as ‘Do Not Track.’”). 
162
 See James Temple, Is ‘Do Not Track’ Dead?, SFGATE (Oct. 11, 2012, 4:53 PM),  
http://www.sfgate.com/technology/dotcommentary/article/Is-do-not-track-dead-3940805.php (“After 
months of occasionally constructive discussions to define what it should mean when consumers flip on a 
‘do not track’ switch in Web browsers, advertising lobbyists threw the talks into disarray last week by 
advancing an outlandish proposal . . . .  [T]he Digital Advertising Alliance and Association of National 
Advertisers pushed to exempt from the rules all online marketing and advertising—the issue at the heart  
of the debate.”). 
163
 See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission v. Toysmart.com, LLC, Civ.A. No. 00-CV-11341-RGS, slip op. 
at 1 (D. Mass. Aug. 21, 2000) (alleging that Toysmart engaged in deceptive acts or practices in violation of 
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act when it violated the terms of its privacy policy with 
consumers about disclosure of personal information and therefore engaged); FTC Announces Settlement 
with Bankrupt Website, Toysmart.com, Regarding Alleged Privacy Policy Violations, FTC (July 21, 2000), 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/07/toysmart2.shtm (“In a settlement announced today by the Federal Trade 
Commission, Toysmart.com (‘Toysmart’) has agreed to settle charges the company violated Section 5 of 
the FTC Act by misrepresenting to consumers that personal information would never be shared with third 
parties and then disclosing, selling, or offering that information for sale in violation of the company's own 
privacy statement.”). 
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when their implementation actively increases the transaction costs involved in protecting 
privacy.164  Second, it asserts that only automated features can sufficiently reduce 
consumer privacy transaction costs such that one might assess the contours of a market 
for privacy platforms.  It concludes that advertising industry advocates do not embrace 
free-market principles, but rather seek to prevent products with innovative privacy 
features like default DNT from reaching the market.   
A. Transaction Costs and Bespoke Contract Terms 
¶85  This section explores the implications for models of privacy should consumers be 
required to manually set privacy preferences.  In so doing, the section hopes to establish 
why the fight over privacy should turn on the basic question of how much time and 
money it costs consumers to obtain privacy, instead of continuing to ask what privacy is, 
or whether consumers actually want it.
 
 
¶86  Consumers are often denied the ability to offer their own contract terms when they 
contract online.  For example, a consumer term might be ignored under the standard 
established in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg165 and Hill v. Gateway.166  More often, though, 
consumers are denied the ability to set their own terms online as a matter of design.  
Websites and e-commercial forms do not contain any way for consumers to offer their 
own terms.167  Online forms carefully control what the consumer is allowed to express.  
In most online transactions, consumers may only specify how many of a good they wish 
to order.  Other terms such as warranties, remedies, or limitations are not negotiable 
because the mechanics of the online form lack such affordances.168 
¶87  The most common rationale for denying consumers the right to introduce contract 
terms is that doing so would raise transaction costs online.169  There is developed 
 
164
 See McDonald & Cranor, supra note 73 (“Privacy policies should help reduce information 
asymmetries because companies share information with their customers . . . . [but] if the cost for reading 
privacy policies is too high, people are unlikely to read policies.”); see also Jeff Sovern, Toward a New 
Model of Consumer Protection: The Problem of Inflated Transaction Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 
1637 (2006) (“In many circumstances, businesses benefit by increasing consumer transaction costs to the 
detriment of consumers . . . . [S]ome practices are profitable largely because they inflate consumer 
transaction costs  . . . . [F]irms increase consumer transaction costs because doing so enriches them.”). 
165
 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Our case has only one form; 
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ProCD to software, but where’s the sense in that?  ProCD is about the law of contract, not the law of 
software.”). 
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MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 161, 184 (2005) (“Electronic commerce is so standardized and automated that 
understanding the total mechanism of a business model is important.  A transaction in an electronic 
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law); Lemley, supra note 143, at 459 (“Today, by contrast, more and more courts and commentators seem 
willing to accept the idea that if a business writes a document and calls it a contract, courts will enforce it 
as a contract even if no one agrees to it.”). 
169
 See Kobayashi, supra note 167, at 168 (2005) (“While the rapid and standardized character of 
electronic commerce substantially reduces direct administration costs, substantive contract negotiations are 
more difficult.  This means that transaction costs for executing complete contracts (contract drafting costs) 




literature on the costs of bespoke contracting in online contracts.170  Bespoke contract 
terms raise transaction costs.171  If consumers (or any contracting party online) were free 
to add individuated, customized clauses to every contract online, the transaction costs for 
businesses would rise significantly.  Businesses would be required to read each contract 
to ensure that the term modified by the consumer would not scuttle the deal.   
¶88  For this reason, courts prefer standardized contracts over bespoke terms.172  Yet the 
problem stems from bespoke terms,173 rather than customer-proffered terms.174  Whether a 
term is bespoke or standardized impacts transaction costs.  Whether a term is offered by a 
corporation or a consumer does not.  In the case of Do-Not-Track, it is the consumer who 
offers a standardized term.   
¶89  The advertising industry attempts to confuse the meaning of a facially valid Do-
Not-Track flag by insisting that only those flags that the consumer subjectively desires 
should be enforceable.175  Conditioning enforcement on subjective and bespoke terms 
should be the last thing advertisers want.  Suppose courts actually enforced idiosyncratic, 
subjective consumer preferences in mass-market contracts.  By advocating for a bespoke 
standard, advertisers would do themselves grave economic harm.  They would be bound 
to those terms the consumer subjectively desired, regardless of objective appearances.  
They would be bound by idiosyncratic terms, regardless of the existence of a standard.  
¶90  Do-Not-Track is a standardized, objectively clear term.  If advertisers left the 
meaning of the flag alone, compliance costs with the flag would be near-zero.  Once the 
flag is communicated, the corporation may not track.  There need be no complicated 
meta-analysis in which the corporation ignores the facially valid flag because it can 
manufacture doubt about what the consumer subjectively wanted.  If a corporation 
 
are relatively high.”); see also McDonald & Cranor, supra note 73, at 564. 
170
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Optimal Standardization in the Law of Contract, 58 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1405 (2009) (“If standardized deals 
lower information costs, customized deals may raise them. . . . [C]ustomized deals that economic theory 
has long considered efficient instead increase information costs for third parties and thus can be suboptimal 
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 See Robert B. Ahdieh, The Strategy of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1034 (2006) (“[R]eliance 
on standard terms may minimize the transaction costs of drafting and negotiating contract terms.”). 
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 See Fairfield, supra note 170, at 1451 (“Despite court rhetoric disfavoring standardized agreements, 
some courts protect standardized deals by using anti- standardization doctrines to strike outlier terms.”). 
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 See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
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customize their own terms. . . .  Filtering systems on personal computers would be market solutions 
because computer users would be free to use them or not use them . . . .”). 
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receives a DNT flag and cannot function without tracking, the simplest expedient would 
be for the corporation to refuse access to the consumer, as some sites do to surfers who 
disable cookies.   
¶91  Bespoke clauses not only raise transaction costs individually, but also raise 
transaction costs in the aggregate.  The simple reason privacy policies have failed is that 
there are too many of them for consumers to read,176 as the transaction costs of interacting 
with counterparties are multiplied by the number of counterparties.  These costs are, in 
the aggregate, too much for consumers to pay.177  The basic logical failure of the current 
privacy framework lies in considering the cost of each privacy feature alone, rather than 
the cost of privacy in the aggregate.  Reading one privacy policy might not be too much 
to ask.  Reading hundreds of thousands of privacy policies is impossible.178   
¶92  Similarly, setting one privacy flag might not be too much to ask.  To ask consumers 
to understand and configure increasing numbers of privacy features by hand is, in the 
aggregate, to condemn them to failure.179  Privacy enhancements must multiply as means 
of invading privacy multiply.  If each marginal privacy-invading feature can be 
automated while each marginal privacy-protecting feature must be hand-configured, 
consumers will lose.180  Skewing the transaction costs skews the market for privacy 
features. 
¶93  The best way not to be tracked is to choose and use a browser that does not permit 
tracking through a constantly expanding suite of automated, integrated features.  The 
value of an integrated privacy-protecting browser is that all of the settings, by default, are 
pro-privacy.181  Simplicity, and thus effectiveness, is a function of the aggregate cost of 
using a program, not a function of any given feature.  Without integration and 
 
176
 See Karim Z. Oussayef, Selective Privacy: Facilitating Market-Based Solutions to Data Breaches by 
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encourage companies to make strong privacy protections the default.”). 




automation, each feature may be individually simple, while the aggregate becomes 
unwieldy.182   
¶94  Browsers like the TOR Browser provide the feature of simplicity, of having already 
integrated privacy as a guiding principle from the ground up.183  Their value lies in the 
fact that one does not have to go through a complex configuration process to use them.  
Rather, the defaults have been set to protect privacy at each distinct level.   
¶95  Insisting that privacy features be simple by design does not resolve the aggregation 
problem.  This explains why regulatory memes like “privacy by design” have had limited 
success in convincing companies dependent on advertising revenue to design products 
that protect consumers’ privacy.184  One example is the infamous suite of Facebook 
privacy controls.185  Requiring that privacy features be included by design does not 
answer whether the features are useable or useful in the aggregate.186   
¶96  Privacy by design will not succeed either as a self- or government-regulatory 
narrative unless it expressly incorporates aggregate simplicity as its governing principle.  
Privacy features must constantly expand.  Unless a product with n+1, n+10, or n+100 
features is precisely as simple to use as a product with n features, the aggregate cost of 
configuring features will alone defeat any attempt to protect privacy.  The only way this 
can be handled is through competitive offerings of products that automate and integrate 
privacy features. 
¶97  The ostensibly pro-market and pro-consumer-choice opponents of default DNT 
oppose this kind of free-market test.  The function of the TPE bespoke standard is to 
prevent Microsoft (or any other competitor) from offering consumers a product that 
contains a competitive integrated and automated feature: do-not-track enabled as a 
default setting.187  This makes no sense whatsoever if the industry’s goal is truly to satisfy 
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actual consumer preferences for a profit.  Here, however, a group of companies seeks to 
stop one of its members from offering a pro-consumer privacy feature.188   
¶98  This is anti-competitive and anti-free-market.189  The TPE standard does not create 
the basis for a developing market for privacy features, as it should.  Instead, The TPE 
establishes a punishment for those who bring new privacy features to the market: their 
browsers will not be protected by DNT.  The standard directly prevents one of the most 
important privacy features from reaching the market.  If the TPE bespoke standard 
effectively stops one privacy feature from being integrated and automated on the grounds 
that integration and automation do not reflect user choice, it will stop more.  The effects 
of the TPE bespoke standard will therefore be felt well beyond the narrow range of  
Do-Not-Track. 
¶99  Finally, the TPE bespoke standard is corrosive because it reinforces the idea that 
consumers are second-class citizens in the realm of online contracting.  As a thought 
experiment, consider treating both parties to an online contract equally, each with the full 
power to offer and reject terms.  If both corporations and consumers are forced to 
contract by hand online, e-commerce will grind to a halt.  If both corporations and 
consumers are free to use software agents to automate transactions, then online 
transactions will proceed with lower transaction costs and a higher volume of gainful 
trades.190  In no case does it make sense to give the power to offer and enforce automated 
contract terms to one party but deny it to the other.  Yet this is precisely the state of 
affairs that courts and industry groups have brought about.191  Corporations contract daily 
with millions of consumers by offering automated deals to purchase their private 
information.  Yet corporations do not wish to be bound by consumers’ own  
automated terms. 
B. Establishing a Market for Privacy 
¶100  It is more useful to reduce the staggering burden of consumer privacy transaction 
costs than it is to hypothesize about, much less set industry standards based on, any 
substantive theoretical model of privacy.192  It is certainly a mistake to base legal 
standards on a demonstrably wrong theory of online consent.  That is what the TPE 
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bespoke standard does when it denies consumers the ability to choose pro-privacy 
products, in the name of protecting consumer choice.  
¶101  The market for privacy features is only visible through the very dirty window of 
transaction costs.  Some theories of privacy further muddy the window and obscure the 
market for privacy.  Substantive theories of privacy are suspect when their 
implementation increases transaction costs.  The view that consumer choice must be 
limited to a specific kind of check-the-radio-button choice, and not as to which product to 
use, is precisely the sort of theory that one should suspect.   
¶102  It is better to reduce transaction costs and generate a true market test.  A true 
market test would permit customers to choose between products that offer default 
automated privacy features, and those that offer bespoke hand-configured privacy 
features.  But if the TPE bespoke setting becomes the industry standard, or if the FTC 
then tacitly adopts it as a standard against which unfair or deceptive practices are 
measured for purposes of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,193 consumers 
will never have that choice—the bespoke standard would be the standard enforced 
by the FTC. 
¶103  It is common to assert that privacy is dead because consumers do not succeed in 
protecting their privacy rights.194  The argument is circular.  Consumers do not succeed in 
protecting privacy, therefore they must not value privacy.  Yet given the transaction costs 
that consumers are forced to bear to achieve any modicum of privacy protection, it is 
simply inaccurate to assert that consumers do not value privacy merely because they do 
not use tools calculated to avoid use.   
¶104  For industries that oppose privacy,195 it is much more politically effective to offer a 
competing high-transaction-cost substantive model of privacy, than to openly oppose 
consumer choice.  These models then self-perpetuate because they obscure the very 
market that the model was meant to describe.  Supporting costly choice has proven a 
better political strategy than openly opposing privacy.   
¶105  The self-regulatory frameworks proposed by the advertising industry are grounded 
on a high-transaction-cost substantive privacy model.  Advertisers then mistake consumer 
failure to overcome transaction costs for lack of a market demand for privacy.196  For 
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example, in Senate hearings on industry self-regulation and Do-Not-Track, a speaker 
from the Digital Advertising Alliance claimed that a no-tracking system had been 
implemented by advertisers, that it was responsive to customer concerns, and that it was 
effective.197  The DAA’s opt-out system was supposedly offered in one trillion 
advertisements a month, but was used only one million times during half a year.198  As 
another speaker on the same panel noted, the overall numbers indicated that the DAA’s 
opt-out icon was used by four hundredths of one percent of consumers.199 
¶106  These numbers drive the privacy-is-dead meme.  They are also misleading, because 
they mistake transaction costs for lack of substantive interest in privacy.  Consider 
several points of comparison.  While the DAA Ad-option icon registers a four-hundredths 
of one percent use rate by consumers,200 Mozilla has a nine percent adoption rate of users 
who find and set the Do-Not-Track flag in its desktop browser version, versus eighteen 
percent of users who find and set the Do-Not-Track flag in Mozilla’s mobile version.201  
Before rolling out IE10, Microsoft’s surveys indicated seventy-five percent of customers 
preferred not to be tracked.202  A recent Customer Commons study found that 92% of 
survey respondents falsified or withheld personal information for the sake of maintaining 
privacy online.203  Finally, a Pew survey indicated that sixty-eight percent of Americans 
are “NOT OKAY” with online tracking.204  Either large numbers of surveyed consumers 
are dissembling as to their privacy preferences, or opt-out options like the DAA’s Ad-
option icon are hard to find and use, and are lost in the flood of other icons, seals, and 
marks online.  The second explanation is simpler and more likely to be accurate. 
¶107  In the specific case of the DAA Ad-option icon, people may not use it because they 
are required to click on an ad to do so.  Consumers may believe that this will lead to more 
advertising and tracking, not less.205  They also may not understand what the icon means.  
As a simple non-scientific experiment, the reader might also ask herself if she has ever 
seen, used, or understood the DAA Ad-option icon.206  And that icon is just one of 
hundreds of privacy seals and symbols, each with different meanings.   
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¶108  Given that transaction costs are central to the political strategy of limiting 
consumer choice online, transaction costs should continue to play an increasingly 
important role in privacy analysis.  Too often economic argumentation about privacy is 
directed toward a costless bargaining world.  In such a world, for example, consumers 
would be able to express their preferences at no cost, and therefore there would be no 
need for integration or automation.207  But this is a severely limited view of economics.  
A better approach might be to say that the concept of the Coasean bargain does not render 
transaction costs irrelevant, but instead makes transaction costs central to every theory.208  
If bargains are costless, certain results follow.  But if bargains are not costless—and here 
they are not—then those results do not follow.  Using transaction-cost-free analysis to 
describe the market in personal information is like using friction-free physics to describe 
a football game.  
¶109  Preferences in privacy will be better served by reducing transaction costs, than by 
applying a model of substantive privacy that raises costs.  Whichever privacy model one 
asserts to be true, it can only face a true market test if both consumers and corporations 
are permitted to use the lowest-cost method of communicating their preferences.  In the 
online context, that lowest-cost method is the use of automated, default, integrated 
features set by software agents.   
IV. CHALLENGES AND ANSWERS 
¶110  This section seeks to anticipate and answer counterarguments.  The most 
compelling point against all of the following potential counterarguments is that their 
effect is to avoid a market test between automated and bespoke privacy features.  The 
following subparts address and evaluate each potential counterargument in turn. 
A. Is Tracking Preference Expression Trivial? 
¶111  A first potential challenge is that it is trivial to set the flag.  The argument runs as 
follows: The American public does not want privacy.  For those rare zealots who do want 
privacy, it is not too much to ask that they set a Do-Not-Track flag by hand.  Their 
privacy will then be safeguarded and the Internet will continue to be funded by consumer 
tracking. 
¶112  This argument fails because both sides agree that the default rule for privacy 
significantly influences the contours of the market.209  This is why the underlying battle 
between opt-in and opt-out tracking has been so bitterly debated.210  If the default rule is 
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privacy, most people will not change that default.211  If the default rule is tracking, most 
people will not change that default.212  The selection of default is therefore not trivial.   
¶113  The argument that default Do-Not-Track is trivial further rests on the assumption 
that advertisers would honor the user’s tracking preference if it were set by hand.  But 
advertisers do not respect hand-set DNT flags,213 and the effect of banning default Do-
Not-Track is that even more hand-set DNT flags will be ignored.  Do-Not-Track flags are 
now in all major browsers, and vanishingly few advertisers honor them.  The flags that 
are in current major browsers are all bespoke.  Users must set them by hand, and few 
people do.  But corporations ignore even those flags that meet the bespoke standard.  The 
fight over default Do-Not-Track serves only to undermine the standard so that 
corporations may continue to ignore the flags.  
¶114  The argument that switching is trivial also relies on individual feature cost, not 
aggregate cost.  The aggregate time cost of configuring privacy controls is not trivial.  
Consider the protections that a consumer must configure by hand as things currently 
stand.  She must install and configure malware-detecting software to stop computer 
applications from spying on her.  She may want to try Linux.  She must find a way to 
automate encrypted connections to prevent over-the-wire spying from her Internet service 
provider (ISP).  She must find a way to avoid traffic analysis, usually by means of a 
proxy or VPN.  She must disable cookies.  She must regularly conduct maintenance to 
attempt to remove cookies that circumvent her protections.214  She must install and 
configure ad-blocking software, since the advertisements that are served track her 
movements across the web.  She must select a search engine, like Ixquick’s 
Startpage.com, that does not track her online searches.215  She may, at an entirely 
different level of futility, read and attempt to understand online privacy policies or 
manage the plethora of ad preferences managers, privacy icons, privacy seals, or other 
complicated privacy controls offered by online advertisers, ISPs, and website hosts. 
¶115  But she is still not done.  She must, finally, find and enable the Do-Not-Track flag.  
Each individual step does not seem difficult, but in the aggregate, the process is 
prohibitively cumbersome.216  Even if she takes all these steps, her movements online 
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possess only a bare modicum of privacy, easily breached by anyone willing to step even 
the slightest bit outside of the rules.  A better option is to simply download a browser that 
contains these features as an integrated, automated, and optimized feature set.217  It is 
precisely this option that the TPE bespoke standard forecloses. 
¶116  There is only one solution to the problem of aggregate costs of privacy protection.  
Privacy features must multiply as tracking techniques multiply.  Just as tracking 
techniques must be automated to be effective, so must privacy features be part of a 
comprehensive, integrated, and automated consumer package in order for the consumer 
to get any practical protection at all.  The contrary view, that additional tracking 
techniques may be implemented automatically, while any additional privacy features 
must be enabled by hand, simply imposes imbalanced transaction costs on consumers.  If 
tracking can be automated while privacy features must be enabled by hand, few 
additional privacy features will be added to products, and almost none will be enabled. 
B. Does Default Do-Not-Track Muddy the Standard? 
¶117  A second claim is that default Do-Not-Track blurs the communicative power of the 
DNT flag.  The argument is that Do-Not-Track is powerful because it stands for the 
consumer’s expressed preference not to be tracked.218  Permitting software to configure 
that preference, goes the claim, muddies the standard because the corporation now cannot 
be sure that the consumer truly wished not to be tracked.219 
¶118  Advertisers have long attempted to argue that they could not be held responsible for 
respecting any Do-Not-Track flag because the meaning of the flag was unclear.220  Yet 
the presence of an obvious, continuous machine-readable Do-Not-Track flag is not 
merely clear, it is unavoidably clear.  The problem is not that corporations do not 
understand what a Do-Not-Track flag means, it is that they wish to manufacture doubt as 
to how the flag was set so that they may continue to track.221 
 
217
 See Ohm, supra note 51. 
218
 See Roy Fielding, Comment to Apache Does Not Tolerate Deliberate Abuse of Open Standards, 
GITHUB, 
https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/a381ff35fa4d50a5f7b9f64300dfd98859dee8d0#commitcomment-
1819635 (last visited Oct. 18, 2012) (“The only reason DNT exists is to express a non-default option. That's 
all it does. It does not protect anyone's privacy unless the recipients believe it was set by a real human 
being, with a real preference for privacy over personalization.”). 
219
 See E-mail from Mike Zaneis to David Singer, supra note 175 (“If the site does not believe the 
DNT:1 signal is valid, then why would anyone in the supply chain be expected to honor the invalid 
signal?”). 
220
 See Elise Ackerman, Google and Facebook Ignore “Do Not Track” Requests, Claim They Confuse 
Customers, FORBES (Feb. 27, 2013, 7:58 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/eliseackerman/2013/02/27/big-
internet-companies-struggle-over-proper-response-to-consumers-do-not-track-requests/ (“ [S]pokespeople 
from Google and Facebook explained that they are not responding to “do not track” requests because it 
isn’t clear that consumers know what “do not track” means.  Keith Enright, a senior policy counsel at 
Google, said there is a “consumer confusion question” that is caused by the fact that there is still no official, 
industry-accepted “Do Not Track” standard. Acknowledging a consumer’s “do not track” preference “in 
some ad hoc way” may not be meeting that user’s expectations, Enright explained.  Erin Egan, the chief 
privacy officer of Facebook, said she also wasn’t sure that a “do not track” setting on a browser actually 
reflected a user’s desire not to be tracked, especially in cases where a company like Facebook was tracking 
users in order to customize their web experience, rather than to sell advertising.”). 
221
 Cf. Ohm, supra note 51.  
NOR TH WES TERN JO URN AL O F TECH NO LO GY  AND IN TE LLEC TU A L PRO PER TY  [ 2 0 1 3  
 
614 
¶119  The attack on default Do-Not-Track is useful to advertisers precisely because it will 
spill over and permit advertisers to ignore all Do-Not-Track flags, bespoke, or default.  If 
a user sets the flag, that flag is set to DNT:1.222  If the browser sets the flag during the 
customer’s installation process, the flag is also set to DNT:1.  The only way that a web 
server can determine whether the flag was set by default or by hand is to query the 
browser, termed “user agent sniffing” or “browser sniffing,” which is considered bad 
coding practice.223  But even this technique will not work in the long run, since the web 
server can only sniff information that the browser conveys.  If the browser conveys only 
the information that the flag has been set DNT:1, the web server cannot distinguish.  
¶120  The only long-term way to stop automated Do-Not-Track is to target specific 
companies and products that offer it.  In the case of Microsoft’s IE10, web servers must 
be programmed to ignore all Do-Not-Track flags set by IE10.224  Only an overall attack 
on the entire DNT standard will work.  And this overall attack coincidentally happens to 
invalidate hand-set DNT flags in one of the world’s most popular lines of browsers.  The 
attack on default Do-Not-Track is an unsubtle attack on all of Do-Not-Track, since there 
is no way to tell whether the flag was set by hand, by default, or during the installation 
process.  Unfortunately, this attack stands a good chance of succeeding, given the current 
adoption of the bespoke standard in the TPE. 
¶121  A good example of an attack on DNT was the 2012 patch released for Apache, the 
web server software that runs a good portion of corporate-side websites.  The proposed 
patch ignored the Do-Not-Track flag on the ground that it has not been set by the 
consumer.225  This approach has a certain tit-for-tat appeal.  After all, if consumers can 
automatically set Do-Not-Track flags, perhaps corporations can automatically ignore 
them.  The patch was eventually commented out by the Apache community,226 but the 
point it made was clear: developers who protect privacy by enabling Do-Not-Track by 
default run the risk of losing privacy protection for all of their customers, including those 
who set the flag by hand.   
¶122  Simply ignoring DNT flags on a browser level also ignores the underlying 
apparatus of contract law.  If a corporation receives clear, unambiguous notice that a 
consumer does not consent to tracking, the corporation should not be permitted to 
proceed with the transaction as if that preference were not communicated.  A brief 
example may clarify.  Imagine the following scenario: I go into a store and offer to buy a 
$100 television set for $25.  The store has the right to set whatever price it wishes, 
without a doubt.  It has the power to refuse to sell to me for $25.  But it absolutely does 
not have the right to accept my offer, sell me the TV, and then charge my  
credit card $100. 
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¶123  In the DNT context, a company may exclude the consumer from its website if a 
consumer’s tracking preference kills the deal.  Or the corporation may propose a 
counteroffer.  This is how some sites handle cookies now.  The user is excluded until they 
enable cookies.  The corporation may thus refuse the consumer’s terms, or rewrite the 
terms of its own contract to offer a different deal.  But the corporation may not rewrite 
the terms of the consumer’s offer.   
¶124  A threat to ignore all DNT flags set by a given browser is a threat to any company 
that proposes an advance in automatic, default privacy protections for consumers.  If 
IE10 chooses to enact positive privacy protections for its users, online advertisers will 
deny IE10 users privacy protections that they extend to other browser users.  The very 
attribute that might make IE10 attractive to consumers (that it takes privacy protections 
seriously, at least in this respect) is directly undermined—indeed destroyed—by the 
threat of online advertisers to retaliate against consumers who choose IE10.   
¶125  For this reason, it is important to think about consumer choice as being exercised at 
the product level and not merely at the feature level.  Whereas corporations claim they 
are forced to ignore DNT flags because they have too little information, they are in fact 
ignoring the Do-Not-Track flag precisely because they have a glut of information.  When 
a corporation receives a Do-Not-Track flag from an IE10 browser, the corporation is 
acting not only upon knowledge of receipt of the browser flag, but also on knowledge of 
the browser installation process and feature set.   
¶126  In acting from a surfeit, rather than a lack, of knowledge, advertisers have done 
significant damage to the credibility of their claim that default Do-Not-Track is unclear.  
The corporation has received a request not to track.  In fact, the corporation knows that 
the browser the consumer chose has Do-Not-Track as a core feature of the product.  Now 
the corporation has the unenviable position of explaining why it wishes to ignore the flag.  
¶127  Moreover, suppose this standard for signal clarity were turned on corporations.  
Suppose that corporate contracts were not enforceable if the consumer could manufacture 
some doubt as to whether the corporation really wanted the term, as opposed to merely 
including it in automated boilerplate.  This cannot be the online standard for contract 
formation.  Online parties are bound by the contract terms their software agents express.   
¶128  The inconsistency runs deeper.  Corporations are not so solicitous of the absolute 
agreement of consumers to every online term.  Usually consumers are bound by terms 
they have not even reviewed.227  Yet under the corporate analysis, a Do-Not-Track term is 
different.  The consumer must express this particular term—the Do-Not-Track term—by 
hand precisely because the advertising companies do not want the term to be expressed. 
C. Can Corporations Undo Do-Not-Track with EULAs or Terms of Service? 
¶129  The TPE implies in its discussion of Tracking Status Value that even if a consumer 
sends a valid, non-default DNT flag, a web server may still ignore that flag, based on the 
web server operator’s belief that the server has received separate consent to tracking.228  
The W3C’s Tracking Compliance and Scope document expressly permits out-of-band 
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consent to trump the DNT signal.229  This creates a loophole that could potentially 
swallow the rule, since out-of-band consent is not limited in time, nor can consent be 
retracted through the DNT process.  Note, also, that the question is framed expressly in 
terms of the corporation’s belief that it has received prior consent.  The ability to ignore 
the DNT flag is based on the designated resource’s “belie[f] it has received prior consent 
for tracking this user, user agent, or device, perhaps via some mechanism not  
defined by this specification, and that prior consent overrides the tracking preference 
expressed by this protocol.”230 
¶130  Out-of-band consent creates a real problem for Do-Not-Track, especially when the 
licensor of an internet access device is the same as the licensor of the internet browser the 
consumer uses.  If the Apple iPad license purports to exempt Apple services and affiliates 
from Do-Not-Track, or if the Android license exempts Google from Do-Not-Track, the 
standard will be unlikely to meet consumer expectations of privacy.  All Android users 
would be vulnerable to tracking across nearly half of the internet.  What the company 
gives in the browser, it takes away in the device licenses.  And this is very likely to 
happen: many believe the primary reason that Google licenses Android for free is 
because the device then privileges Google’s search and advertising functions for users of 
the device.231  The upshot is that out-of-band consent will serve mostly as a way of 
tricking consumers who believe their DNT flag will be respected. 
¶131  There is some hope that default automated browser responses might be able to limit 
this otherwise gaping loophole.  The Tracking Status Value section of the TPE does state, 
at the least, that servers that believe they are relying on prior consent must, for example, 
indicate that prior consent by returning a Tracking Status Value of “C” to the user’s 
transmission of the DNT:1 flag.232  This might permit browser manufacturers to build in 
options that permit users to reject “C” Tracking Status Values.  But this would require 
either the browser to set the “C” rejection automatically (raising the question of 
automation and defaults all over again), or would require the consumer to understand and 
configure the browser to deal with an additional level of complexity.  This creates a 
vicious cycle of complexity, increasing consumer costs again, even if it were to work.   
D. Will Respecting Consumer Privacy Damage the Internet? 
¶132  Another often-repeated argument raised by industry advocates is that targeted 
advertising is the only method of monetizing the Internet that has thus far worked.233  
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Respecting consumer preferences regarding privacy would kill this model, they claim.234  
They assert that the effect would be particularly strong if the default rule for tracking 
were changed by default Do-Not-Track.  This would create a de-facto “opt-in” system for 
tracking.  The large majority of consumers would not opt in, goes the logic, and thus 
online targeted advertising would suffer. 
¶133  This argument seems quite correct.  Indeed, it is tautological.  Prohibiting invasions 
of privacy will inhibit business models based on invading privacy.  Reducing transaction 
costs for consumers to defend their privacy will sit poorly with corporations who have 
enjoyed untrammeled access to consumer data.235  While the argument is correct, it does 
not help us decide between benefits to corporations and costs to consumers. 
¶134  Industry is never pleased with rules that prevent forcing deals or ads on consumers 
without their consent.  The publishing industry was undoubtedly displeased with rules 
saying that they could not ship products to people without consent and then charge 
them.236  The advertising-by-fax industry was certainly displeased by the TCPA’s ban on 
unsolicited fax advertising.237  The telemarketing industry was certainly not pleased with 
the federal Do-Not-Call list.238  The bottom line is the same: Banning coercive sales and 
invasive advertising practices harms industry, but the overall harm to society of 
permitting these kinds of techniques is greater.239 
¶135  The relevant question is not whether corporations will be better or worse off if 
consumers can protect their privacy.  A better question would include costs and benefits 
to consumers as well as to industry.  The best question would be whether the benefit to 
consumers of privacy, as measured by the market, outweighs or is outweighed by the 
benefit to consumers of services that are financed through datamining personal 
information.  The best way—perhaps the only way—to ask this question is to permit a 
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true market test.  Browsers with automated and default privacy functionality must be 
permitted to compete with browsers that require users to configure privacy features by 
hand.  Insisting that consumer preferences can only be honored in one or the other 
fashion intentionally distorts the market test. 
¶136  Industry claims of harm due to competition should also be taken with a grain of 
salt.240  Microsoft is no privacy angel.241  Microsoft is trying to make money by providing 
enhanced privacy features.  It has determined through focus groups that setting Do-Not-
Track as a default resonated with potential customers.  Microsoft is trying to make a 
profit by making its products more competitive with respect to the ease of privacy 
protection configuration.   
¶137  The addition of default Do-Not-Track is not a story of market failure.  It could be a 
story of successful competition to add privacy features.  However, at the moment it is a 
story about the anticompetitive attempt to keep such products out of consumers’ hands, or 
to ensure that they go largely unused.  As Microsoft’s own checkered antitrust history 
shows, companies may well complain of harm when they are outcompeted.242  Yet social 
welfare is maximized by a free and open market.  Industry advocates want to undermine a 
key feature of a competing product.  But competition helps society.  The arguments from 
industry harm make it clearer than ever that corporate and social welfare are simply not 
identical, and are in cases of anti-competitive behavior directly opposed. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶138  The discourse over Do-Not-Track seems to have achieved broad consensus that 
some form of the technology will be implemented.  But there is a devil in the details.  
Many prior privacy initiatives have failed due to the lack of usability and consumer 
exhaustion.  A solution must be as simple as technology can make it, for it to have any 
chance of success.  Advertisers are willing to see the Do-Not-Track standard fail rather 
than permit it to be low-cost enough for the majority of consumers to use.  Their 
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opposition to default Do-Not-Track may very well succeed in disrupting Do-Not-Track 
as a whole.243 
¶139  The attack comes not directly against Do-Not-Track, but through the requirement 
that the Do-Not-Track flag be set by hand.  The theoretical underpinning of the attack 
comes in the form of an argument about online consent.  According to the standard, 
consumers may not express their preference against tracking at the product level by 
preferring pro-privacy products.  They may only consent at the feature level, by finding 
and hand-configuring privacy features.  Yet only product-level consent, not feature-level 
consent, will permit consumers to defend their privacy. 
¶140  Requiring users to enable privacy features by hand does not ensure consent, since it 
excludes those consumers who express consent at the product level by buying and using 
pro-privacy products.  The bespoke standard merely raises transaction costs.  These 
transaction costs cause a huge shift in whether the privacy tool is used or not.  Further, 
the bespoke standard creates a double standard in favor of corporations and against 
consumers.  It makes as much sense to require consumers to set their privacy preferences 
by hand as it does to require corporations to conduct their online tracking by hand.  
Corporations do all of their online contracting through automated agents, but wish to 
require consumers to protect their privacy preferences by hand. 
¶141  Finally, the bespoke standard is profoundly anticompetitive.  A refrain from 
industry advocates throughout the congressional hearings on Do-Not-Track is that they 
passionately believe that companies will respond to the demand for privacy by 
introducing products with better privacy features.244  A company has done so, and the 
response from the standard-setting group and advertising industry has been to undermine 
the efficacy of that feature and punish all consumers who use the pro-privacy product.  
This is not the behavior of a healthy market in privacy features for consumers. 
¶142  The opposition from advertising industry advocates is an attempt not to clarify 
what was unclear, but to complicate the simple.  The bespoke standard of the TPE is a 
step in the wrong direction.  It should not become a standard; it should not be adopted as 
best practices by the FTC; and it certainly should not find its way into any developing 
legislation.  For Do-Not-Track to be effective, it must be capable of being delivered to 
 
243
 See Juliana Gruenwald, Do-Not-Track Proposal Headed Off the Tracks, NAT’L JOURNAL, 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/do-not-track-proposal-headed-off-the-tracks-20121009 (last updated 
Oct. 9, 2012, 4:16 PM) (‘“DAA is trying to turn DNT into TNT and blow the process up,’ said Jeff Chester, 
executive director for the Center for Digital Democracy. . . .  Electronic Frontier Foundation Staff 
Technologist Dan Auerbach also . . . said ‘it seems clear they [advertising industry officials] want to stifle 
the progress’ on do-not-track.” (alteration in original)). 
 
244
 See Self-Regulation Hearing, supra note 10 (testimony of Bob Liodice, President and Chief 
Executive Office Association of National Advertisers, Inc.) (“Companies are increasingly offering 
consumers new privacy features and tools such as sophisticated preference managers, persistent opt outs, 
universal choice mechanisms, and shortened data retention policies.  These developments demonstrate that 
companies are responsive to consumers and that companies are focusing on privacy as a means to 
distinguish themselves in the marketplace.”); A Status Update on the Development of Voluntary Do-Not-
Track Standards: Hearing Before S. Comm. On Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 112th  Cong. 17 
(2013) (written Testimony of Luigi Mastria, Managing Director, Digital Advertising Alliance), available at 
http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=cd2e39e0-6825-4b8c-9789-
40d26a72d457  (“[L]egislation thwarts innovation and hinders economic growth and can impede a 
competitive marketplace that offers a full range of choice to consumers.”). 
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and used by consumers like any other software tool.  Advertisers are attempting to 
confuse what is already very clear.  Do-Not-Track means do not track. 
